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Today’s most reliable data storage systems are made of redundant arrays of 
inexpensive disks (RAID). The quantification of RAID system reliability is often 
based on models that omit critical hard disk drive failure modes, assume all failure 
and restoration rates are constant (exponential distributions), and assume the RAID 
group times to failure follow a homogeneous Poisson process (HPP). This paper 
presents a comprehensive reliability model that accounts for numerous failure causes 
for today’s hard disk drives, allows proper representation of repair and restoration, 
and does not rely on the assumption of a HPP for the RAID group. The model does 
not assume hard disk drives have constant transition rates, but allows each hard disk 
drive "slot" in the RAID group to have its own set of distributions, closed form or 
user defined. Hard disk drive (HDD) failure distributions derived from field usage are 
  
presented, showing that failure distributions are commonly non-homogeneous, 
frequently having increasing hazard rates from time zero. 
Hard disks drive failure modes and causes are presented and used to develop a 
model that reflects not only complete failure, but also degraded conditions due to 
undetected, but corrupted data (latent defects). The model can represent user defined 
distributions for completion of “background scrubbing" to correct (remove) corrupted 
data. Sequential Monte Carlo simulation is used to determine the number of double 
disk failures expected as a function of time. RAID group can be any size up to 25. 
The results are presented as mean cumulative failure distributions for the RAID 
group. Results estimate the number of double disk failures can be as much as 5000 
times greater than that predicted over 10 years when using the mean time to data loss 
method or Markov models when the characteristic lives of the input distributions is 
the same. Model results are compared to actual field data for two HDD families and 
two different RAID group sizes and show good correlation. Results show the rate of 
occurrence of failure for the RAID group may be increasing, decreasing or constant 
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“All models are wrong, some models are useful.” 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
According to IDC, a leading research corporation, revenues for disk storage 
systems grew nearly 9.9% to $6.2 billion for the third quarter of 2006 as compared to 
the third quarter of 2005. The capacity of these systems was in excess of 783 
petabytes, up 50% from the year ago quarter [1]. Much of this storage is deployed in 
redundant arrays of inexpensive disks, or RAID systems. Storage content of these 
systems covers everything from “mission critical” on-line transactions and business 
intelligence, to e-mail, data warehouses, and test and development [2]. Compliance 
with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act1 and the desire for disk-to-disk backup have generated a 
huge potential for the storage industry growth [3]. In all these areas of growth, high 
reliability is a critical feature as evidenced by the use of RAID. 
The most common models for estimating RAID reliability make erroneous 
assumptions regarding the system rate of occurrence of failures; hard disk drive 
failure causes, distributions and consequences; realistic restoration distributions; and 
the tremendous (negative) impact of latent media defects and the beneficial 
effectiveness of data scrubbing. Although recognized by Kari in 1997 [4], only one 
recent research effort by Schwarz addresses the concept [5] of latent defects from a 
system reliability perspective. However, Schwarz continues to use constant failure 
and restoration rates, treats latent defects as time independent probabilities in the final 
Markov model, assess mean time between failures (instead of frequencies of failure), 
develops a simplistic model that does not account for order dependence, and applies 
                                                 





his model towards simple mirrored HDDs. As this thesis unfolds, the bases for these 
criticisms and their solutions will become evident. 
1.1 Thesis Problem Statement 
Current reliability models of RAID storage systems incorrectly estimate the 
number of double disk failures per (N+1) RAID group due to the following: 
a) HDD failures often do not follow a homogeneous Poisson process. Failure 
rates are often increasing or decreasing, not constant 
b) HDD failures do not come from a single population distribution. That is, 
significant time-to-failure variation exists across populations of HDDs from: 
   - different manufacturers 
 - different "families" from the same manufacturer 
 - different vintages in a single "family" from a single manufacturer 
c)  RAID group (system) failures do not follow a homogeneous Poisson process, 
so estimates of the number of DDFs are incorrectly calculated when using 
renewal theory and assuming a HPP 
d) Latent defects in HDD media are not included 
e) The RAID system logic modeled does not properly account for conditional 
order of latent defects and operational failures 
 
This research develops a model that addresses these issues and produces results 
consistent with the over-arching thesis, with general industry results and with specific 




1.2 Thesis Organization 
The model necessary to support my thesis required research in the areas of HDD 
designs and failures, RAID architecture, HDD failure distributions and an 
understanding of renewal theory. The research results are presented in Chapter 2 
through Chapter 4. Chapter 2 presents an overview of HDD design. It includes a brief 
discussion of the basic components in a hard disk drive, shows how data is laid out on 
the discs and presents some of the high probability failure modes and causes. These 
are not new, but are the bases for distinctions in consequences of failures discussed 
later. That is, some failures result in localized data corruption and some result in 
complete HDD failure. 
Chapter 3 describes the RAID system architecture including a high level 
discussion of the processes for recovering from errors and HDD failures. The 
concepts presented in Sections 2 and 3 are used extensively in later development of 
the model.  
The Previous Work, Chapter 4, presents a very significant statistical flaw ignored 
by those assessing RAID reliability. Although known by statisticians and many in the 
field of reliability, the rate of occurrence of failure of the system has little connection 
with the failure rates of the components that make up the system. Even if all the 
components fail according to a Homogeneous Poisson Process (HPP), the system may 
not. All RAID assessments to date assume the system follows a HPP. This research 
does not assume any distribution at the system level and shows the consequences of 




Most researchers have little or no true field reliability data for HDDs upon which 
they base their model assumptions. They cannot see the wide variability that exists 
across manufacturers, within manufacturers’ models, and even within different 
vintages of product form the same manufacturer. Chapter 5 presents a significant 
contribution to the analyses of RAID systems. In this Chapter, times to failure 
distributions are presented based on field data, showing that the constant failure rate 
assumption used by other researchers is generally inaccurate. Vintage analyses are 
presented as well. Knowing the true distributions provides a significant basis for the 
model developed as part of this thesis. 
Chapter 6 presents the logic of the new model, another significant contribution 
from this thesis. In Chapter 7 the Sequential Monte Carlo simulation process is 
presented with application to the general model concepts in Chapter 6. The logic of 
the model and the implementation of the logic in code are validated through several 
studies and comparisons to closed form, manual calculations in Chapter 8. 
In Chapter 9 transition distributions are developed, simulation results are 
presented and the significance of those results is discussed. Chapter 10 provides the 
conclusions for the research, analysis and justification of the thesis statement. It also 




Chapter 2  Hard Disk Drives, Failure Modes and Causes 
The hard disk drive is the building block for a RAID storage system. While 
RAID systems include redundancy, multiple failures can lead to data loss. This 
section provides the background necessary to understand how the failure causes result 
in the failure modes and how those modes affect system operation. HDD general 
design is presented briefly. Because of its importance to the read process, the read 
element is discussed in more detail. The layout of the data on the discs is shown to 
clarify some of the failure modes described in section 2.3, the failure modes and 
causes common to current HDDs. Knowledge of the failure causes is paramount to 
understanding the basis for the new model presented later. In most previous studies, 
ref. [6] for example, it was asserted that the only reason data was written corruptly 
was due to the bit-error rate inherent to the design’s recording channel electronics. 
Once written correctly, it was asserted that a significant cause for corruption after 
being written correctly was due to “bit-rot” in the media [7]. Other recent research 
confirms the failure modes and causes [5] that I present. The discussion here 
augments those studies and identifies additional failure causes that explain and justify 
the design of the model presented later.   
2.1 HDD Description 
In 1988, the total capacity of a single 5 ¼" hard disk drive was around 40 MB 
(megabytes). Today, 3.5" HDDs can be 500 GB (gigabytes) and 750 GB capacity 
HDDs should be available around April, 2007. In 1988 the HDD discs rotated at 




between the head and the disk) of 8-10 μ-in. In 2006, speeds of 10,000 to 15000 rpm 
are commonplace, areal densities are up to 125,000 MB/in.2 [8], and head fly-heights 
are less than 0.5 μ-in. 
All the mechanical components and some of the sensitive electronics are 
contained within the hard disk drive enclosure. The majority of the electronics are 
attached to the printed wiring assembly (PWA) affixed to the outside of the drive. 
The components within the enclosure are assembled in a clean room environment to 
control contamination, humidity and electrostatic discharges (ESD). The HDD 
enclosure is sealed in the clean room and a high purity filter allows air pressure inside 
the enclosure to equilibrate with the local atmospheric pressure.  Figure 1 shows a 
HDD with the cover removed. (The printed wiring assemble is on the opposite side 
and cannot be seen in this photo.) The main components and assemblies within the 
HDD enclosure are labeled, including a voice coil motor assembly, actuator arm, 
read/write heads and the discs (and media). Some designs have a pre-amp attached to 
a flexible cable inside the enclosure. A more detailed description can be found in 
reference [9]. 
Sliders contain the read and write elements, as well as thermal and mechanical 
shields to protect the sensitive reader from particles. The slider is about the size of a 
piece of crushed black pepper.  Hitachi’s “Femto slider”, introduced in 2003, is 
approximately 0.8 x 0.75 x 0.2 mm [10]. Sliders are aerodynamically designed to fly 
less than 10 nanometers (less than 0.4μ-in.) above the surface of the disc [11]. The 
sliders are attached to the “suspension” via a gimbal, and the suspension is affixed to 




head-stack assembly. Usually, there are two heads per disk, although some designs 
may have one head on a single disk for low capacity. Figure 1 shows a stack of 3 
discs and 5 actuator arms. This particular “E-block”, to which the suspensions are 
attached, is designed to accommodate a maximum of 4 discs (8 heads), but the top 
two suspensions were not installed. This de-populated version has 6 heads and ¾ the 
capacity of the fully populated version, but uses the same machined aluminum “E-
block” to minimize unique parts. The actuator arms are moved across the disks using 























Figure 1 - Hard Disk Drive Components 
 
The giant magneto-resistive (GMR) head that contains the read and write 
















masking) or subtractive (ion milling, wet etch, reactive ion etch, chemical mechanical 
processing) photolithography is used to create the necessary patterns on the head [12]. 
The read element alone is composed of multiple layers of materials [13], [14] and 
[15]. Figure 2 shows the layers common to a giant magneto-resistive head, and shows 
the function of each of the layers or groups of layers. There are numerous other 
combinations of materials that can be used to achieve the functions listed. Other 
common anti-ferromagnetic2 materials include NiMn, FeMn and IrMn. Each of these 








Figure 2 - Reader Element Layers and Thicknesses (Å) 
 
The basic operation of a GMR head can be found in numerous references, one of 
which is [16]. There are four functional layers in a GMR element that form the 
foundation of its operation. There is a thick, anti-ferromagnetic layer that serves to fix 
or “pin” the adjacent magnetic layer. The adjacent layer is magnetic, but its magnetic 
orientation is “pinned” or fixed so it cannot change. The third layer is a nonmagnetic 
                                                 
2 The anti-ferromagnetic layer pins the magnetization of an adjacent ferromagnetic layer so that it 





















conductive layer (spacer) followed by a free layer whose magnetic orientation 
changes depending on magnetic fields near it (on the disc itself). The pinned, 
conductive spacer and the free layers are all relatively thin (5-50Å) as compared to 
the anti-ferromagnetic layer (140Å). The conductive layer allows electrons to move 
freely from the pinned layer through the conductor to the free layer. When a magnetic 
field passes near the free layer, the magnetic orientation in the free layer can change. 
When the orientations of the free layer and pinned layer line up (parallel), there is less 
electrical resistance. When the magnetic orientations are not parallel (anti-parallel), 
higher resistance exists. By passing a small current through the head, the change in 
resistance produces a change in voltage. After signal conditioning, these binary 
voltage spikes are interpreted as “0s” or “1s”.  
2.2 Data Layout 
During the manufacturing process, each disc is divided into tracks and sectors as 
illustrated in Figure 3. There are on the order of 100,000 to 500,000 tracks per radial 
inch (TPI) that form concentric circles. There are on the order of 100-150 “servo-
wedges” the radiate out from the center of the discs creating sectors [17]. The track 
sectors between servo wedges are available for user data. User data is written in terms 
of fixed block size, typically 512, 520 or, more recently, 4k Bytes. The arc length at 
the outer diameter is greater than at the inner diameters, so the physical track length 
between servo wedges is greater as well. However, since the number of blocks 
between servo wedges is fixed, the physical length of each block and each sector 
increases along the radius. More sophisticated layouts recover the added physical 




quantity. The lower bits per inch in the outer tracks helps compensate for the 
increased angular velocity in the outer tracks.  
Longer blocks allow for more error correcting capabilities and greater reliability. 
The difference between 512 and 520 blocks is 8 added bytes necessary to enhance 
error correcting capabilities. The recent push for 4k blocks will allow interleaving and 
even greater error recovery algorithms within the HDD even without RAID.  
The servo information is written on a track by track basis, but together the servo 
data across the tracks at any given angle form a servo wedge. Servo data are written 
at the factory and contain parametric information to keep the head properly positioned 
so it seeks, reads and writes to the correct track. While user data, shown as gray, can 
be re-written as needed, the servo data, shown as brown, cannot. Once servo data is 

























2.3 HDD Failure Causes 
This section presents the dominant causes of failure for today’s HDDs. The 
consequences or modes resulting from these failure causes are presented in the next 







Figure 4 - Head & Disc Positions 
2.3.1 Scratches from Hard Particle Contaminants: 
In 2006, the read/write heads are flying in the range of 0.3μ-in. to 0.7μ-in. above 
the media. The heads are so close to the media that particles introduced as a result of 
the manufacturing process can become wedged between the head and media any time 
the disk is rotating. Typically, the loose particles are “hard”, being composed of 
stainless steel, SiO2, carbon, silicon or TiW. Although all disk drive components are 
rigorously cleaned prior to assembly, contaminants that are only 0.3μ-in. are 
extremely difficult to remove from every crease, crack or joint. Often these particles 
will dislodge themselves as the drive is used. The spinning discs create significant air 
turbulence within the drive enclosure and the motion of the actuator itself (to which 









heads. Although the slider is designed to push particles away with a “plow like” 
leading edge, particles can become caught between the reader and the media, 
scratching the media and destroying existing data. 
2.3.2 Media damage from “Soft Particles” 
While some HDD designs use a ramp to unload the heads from the disc surface 
when powered off, others allow the read/write heads to rest on the disk in a specific 
landing zone. If the HDD receives an impact while the heads are in contact with the 
disc surface, the heads can be damaged, but also, soft particle contamination can 
result. Particles made up from the coatings on the disc surface are then able to attach 
to the heads and either interfere with proper reading and writing, or create contact 
between the head and the media, creating a large smear and corrupting the data. 
Smears can occur any time the disc-pack is spinning, not just during writing or 
reading. 
The introduction of perpendicular magnetic recording (PMR), instead of 
longitudinal recording (LMR), requires different material layers in the media. One of 
these is the (relatively) soft magnetic under-layer [18]. This technology is even more 
susceptible to scratches and smears from the softer particle contaminants in the HDD. 
In some instances small particles of the mold-flash from a plastic encapsulated IC 
within the HDD enclosure caused contamination.  
2.3.3 Thermal Effects on Read Heads 
Disc surfaces are coated and polished to control flatness measured by optical 




still leave areas that are raised as compared to the rest of the media surface after 
coating. As the heads pass over these raised areas, one of several things may occur. 
The head can hit the media, creating soft-particle contamination. As the head touches 
the media high localized heating occurs, called a thermal asperity (T/A). The 
localized high heat from the T/A can erase data that is already written. There is a time 
and usage dependence for this frequently occurring event. The effects of the head 
hitting the media can be immediate or cause gradual degradation in the magnetic 
properties of the head if the “bump” is repeatedly impacted. It makes no difference 
whether the heads are reading, writing or simply passing over the spot on the way to 
another track on the disc, the impact causes degradation. If data has already been 
written to that spot then it is lost and a latent defect (failure) exists. If the next 
operation at that spot is a write without a following verification, data will be written 
and, in effect, be corrupted. Only in the case of write verification will the defect be 
identified and the data reallocated to a new sector on the drive.  
The amount of twist permitted in the suspension will also affect the fly-height of 
the heads and therefore affect the frequency of T/As. A suspension that is not robust 
against torsion will twist each time the actuator changes direction. Frequent changes 
in direction create more twist and more head/disc contacts. This phenomenon is 
highly design dependent and there can be significant arm design differences even 
within the same drive manufacturer. 
Temperature has the greatest effect on the reliability of the read elements. 
Prakash [19] points out that the anti-ferromagnetic layer, PtMn in this case, loses its 




temperature, Tb, “exchange anisotropy is lost completely, although exchange coupling 
at the interface is still present [19].” Since the general operating temperature of heads 
is approximately 120 ± 30 °C, and the Tb for PtMn is around 325 °C, any thermal 
source that raises the temperature can cause head failure. Thermal asperities, in which 
the heads hit the surface of the disk while spinning, are one common source of short, 
but very high temperatures. 
While heat does affect the mechanical and electrical properties of the materials, it 
has en even more pronounced effect on the magnetic properties. Tsu [20] studied the 
effects of Joule temperature rise, high current densities and magnetic field resulting 
from applied bias. He conducted a constant-current life test with current density of 
1.8 to 11.5x107 A/cm2 in a convection oven at 25 to 80 °C, for 1000 hours. 
Furthermore, he ran tests at positive and negative bias to see the effects of current 
density. Tsu determined the activation energy for failure by amplitude loss was 1.05 
+/- 0.16 eV and that of resistance loss was 1.27 +/- 0.2eV. The results are seemingly 
unaffected by the bias direction. Reliability is less affected by current density for 
practical reliability than it is by overall sensor temperature. He therefore concludes 
that electro-migration and diffusion are secondary failure mechanisms, and failure of 
the pinning layer from heat is the dominant mechanism.  
2.3.4 Degraded/Unstable Heads 
Read/write heads are as intricate in design as the most sophisticated integrated 
circuit today. The heads rely on magnetic fields from materials that are only a few 
atomic layers thick. Due to their design, they are subject to “inherent instability”. 




become unstable. When this happens, they are no longer able to read data. This 
common failure mechanism creates an operational failure in which the read head 
cannot read. 
Electro-static discharge (ESD) has become one of the most important issues in 
manufacturing GMR heads [21]. Wallash claims GMR heads are “the world’s most 
static sensitive device in mass manufacturing today” [22], and can become 
“wounded” during the head manufacturing or HDD assembly process if ESD is not 
carefully controlled. Many ESD induced failures are immediate and readily apparent. 
These are usually the ones in which the temperatures from the short duration, high 
voltage ESD event causes localized heating, melts one or more layers and changes the 
resistance. As little as 200 mA for 1.5 ns will melt a typical MR sensor [23]. When a 
metal contact is made to a charged MR head, the stored energy is transferred in about 
1 ns [23]. This current can result in temperatures greater than 1400 °C. If not 
completely failed, the high voltage may cause pitting and resistance changes.  
However, the more insidious ESD problem is that of magnetic damage resulting 
from a combination of Joule heating and internal magnetic field switching during the 
ESD event [21]. When the sensor’s temperature exceeds the critical blocking 
temperature of the pinning layer (PtMn), the strength of the pinning layer is reduced 
so the pinned layer will become unstable at lower temperatures. The degree of 
instability or relationship between temperature and time to failure for a damaged head 
depend on the energy from the ESD event, the GMR head design and the material 
layers. The time required to achieve the peak temperature is on the order of 20-30 ns. 




Results of a study by Yang [21] indicate the voltage required to induce magnetic 
damage is about half of that to cause physical breakdown (pitting or melting). This is 
consistent with results reported by Wallash [23], whose results are shown in Figure 5. 
In GMR heads, a single ESD transient (1 ns) with peak current of only 25mA 
(1nJ) can cause severe magnetic changes. ESD Studies have shown that a GMR head 
can be partially damaged by ESD, pass the component (quasi-static test) and 
assembly performance tests and yet rapidly degrade upon use [23], [24]. The 
mechanism by which the magnetic properties change is explained by the blocking 
temperature. Below the device specific blocking temperature, Tb, the anti-
ferromagnetic layer maintains it anisotropic alignment. Above the blocking 
temperature, some grains are no longer aligned and the strength of the field is 
























Another aspect of heads damaged by ESD is that other events that create high 
temperatures, such as thermal asperities, are more likely to cause complete failure of 
the damaged heads by bringing the sensor temperature closer to the blocking 
temperature. For the PtMn GMR sensor, magnetic failure occurs at 34VHBM and the 
resistive failure point is 43 VHBM.  At 150 °C, the magnetic failure occurs at 24VHBM 
and the resistive failure point is 32 VHBM [25]. 
2.3.5 Contamination from Lubrication 
The motors for new HDD designs are often fluid-dynamic bearings. The oil in 
the bearings is contained using barrier films, close tolerances and the inherent oil 
viscosity. Since the bearings are inside the HDD enclosure, any leakage or residual 
oil can become volatile and condense on surfaces such as the discs. The heads pick up 
the oil and are no longer able to read or write. This is a time dependent mechanism 
that is affected by spinning and usage. Properly written data may be unreadable if this 
mechanism occurs. The actuator bearing also has lubricant in it. Any leakage or 
residual will have the same effect as the motor bearing oils. Residual oils from the 
base casting machining processes also can get on the heads and interfere with reading. 
During manufacturing, the discs are coated with a special lubricant to mitigate 
damage if the head should contact the media surface. However, depending on the 
head design, lubrication composition and actuator activity, the heads can pick up 
lubricant from the disc surface. When a sufficient amount of lube is built up, the head 
will take on different aerodynamic characteristics, often flying much higher than it is 




induce adequate magnetic field to set the bits correctly. These are often referred to as 
a “high fly writes” which are magnetically too weak to be read. 
Fly-heights need to be low to increase reliability of the data read/write process 
and to increase the areal density of the discs. It is not likely that the fly-heights will 
ever increase; only that they will decrease and heads will continue to get closer to the 
discs. Contaminant reduction efforts will continue at the drive manufacturer, but this 
dominant failure mechanism is not likely to be fully controlled even in the next 
generation of disk drive.  
2.3.6 Other Causes 
Motors:  Most motor bearings for HDDs spinning at 10k - 15k rpm use fluid 
dynamic bearings (FDBs) to reduce non-repeatable run-out and vibration. In a FDB 
the motor spindle is separated from the hub by a small amount of fluid. When 
stopped, the spindle touches the hub. The fluid is “held in” only by the mechanical 
properties of the fluid and the bearing design. It is possible that the bearing can be 
under filled from the outset in the factory or that the fluid leaks during use. Although 
less probable than the mechanisms listed above, fluid loss does occur. Bearing failure 
can occur anytime the discs are spinning and does not depend on the amount of data 
read or written. 
PWBAs: The printed wiring board assembly can also fail. Most frequent causes 
include DRAM failures and mechanical damage. Resistors and capacitors have been 
known to be knocked off the board. These cannot always be found during the test 
process but may show up some later time during use. Both of these failures can render 




2.4 HDD Failure Modes (Consequences) 
The consequences of the HDD failures are a critical aspect of the new model 
developed since each mode has a specific result. Based on the consequences and the 
system operation (discussed later), there are two basically different failure modes: 
cannot find the data and data missing. The read error failure modes discussed below 






























Figure 6 - Fault Tree for Read Errors 
2.4.1 Cannot Find Data 
Servo data is written periodically on every data track of each disc surface in what 











































used solely to control the positioning of the read/write heads and are required for the 
heads to stay on track, whether executing a read, write or seek command. Servo-track 
information is written during the manufacturing process and cannot be reconstructed 
using RAID or rewritten in the fields. Media defects in the servo-wedges can cause 
the HDD to lose track of the heads’ locations or where to move the head for the next 
read or write. These faulty servo tracks will result in the inability to access data, even 
though the data is written and uncorrupted. Servo-wedges can be damaged by 
scratches or thermal asperities. 
Tracks on a HDD are never perfectly circular. The present head position is 
continuously measured and compared to where it should be and a position error signal 
(PES) is used to properly reposition the head over the track. This repeatable run-out 
(RRO) is all part of normal HDD head positioning control. Non-repeatable run-out 
(NRRO) cannot be corrected by the HDD firmware since it is non-repeatable. NRRO, 
caused by mechanical tolerances from the motor bearings, actuator arm bearings, 
noise, vibration and servo-loop response errors, can cause the head positioning to take 
too long to lock onto a track and ultimately produce an error. This mode can be 
induced by excessive wear and is exacerbated by high rotational speeds. It affects 
both ball and fluid-dynamic bearings, but to different amounts. 
All recent HDDs collect and analyze functional and performance data to try and 
predict impending failure using self-monitoring analysis reporting technology 
(SMART). For example, the number of sector reallocations is monitored. If an 
excessive number occur in a specific time interval (values are proprietary), the HDD 




many spare sectors are available on each HDD as long as the SMART threshold is not 
exceeded.  
Most head failures are due to changes in the magnetic properties, not electrical. 
Electro-static discharge (ESD), high temperatures and physical impact all affect 
magnetic properties. As with any highly integrated circuit, ESD can leave the read 
heads in a degraded mode, undetectable by testing. Subsequent moderate to low 
levels of heat will then be sufficient to fail the read heads (magnetically). The read 
element is physically hidden and difficult to damage, but heat can be conducted from 
the shields to the read element, affecting magnetic properties of the reader element, 
especially if already weakened by ESD. 
The electronics on a HDD are complex. Failed DRAM and cracked chip-
capacitors have been known to cause HDD failure. 
2.4.2 Data Missing 
Data can be missing either because it was not written well initially or because it 
was erased or corrupted after being written well. All errors resulting from “data 
missing” are latent because the corrupted data is resident without the knowledge of 
the user or the HDD software knowing 
a) Errors during Writing 
The bit-error rate (BER) is a statistical measure of the effectiveness of all the 
electrical, mechanical, magnetic and firmware control systems working together to 
write (or read) data. Most bit-errors occur on a read command and are corrected, but 




corrupted data during writes. While BER does account for some fraction of defective 
data written to the HDD for both read and write combined, a greater source of write-
errors is magnetic recording media coating the discs. If the media is already 
scratched, contains voids or bumps, or has a hydrocarbon contaminant (machine oil) 
on its surface, write errors will result. The magnetic media in a HDD consists of 
various metallic layers with controlled grain sizes. These are applied through 
sputtering. The surfaces are polished prior to the final application of sputtered carbon 
overcoat. The sputtering process leaves bumps on the disc surfaces which are 
removed with the polishing, but scratches can occur during polishing. 
Writing on scratched, smears or pitted media can also result in corrupted data.  
Smears, caused by “soft” particles such as stainless steel and aluminum, will also 
corrupt data. Pits and voids are caused by particles that were originally embedded in 
the media during the sputtering process and subsequently dislodged during the final 
processing steps or during field use.  
A common cause for poorly written data is “high-fly writes”. Magnetic field 
strength decreases rapidly as a function of distance between the head and the 
magnetic media. The heads are aerodynamically designed to have a negative pressure 
and maintain the small, fixed distance above the disc surface at all times. However, if 
the aerodynamics are perturbed the head can fly too high resulting in weakly 
(magnetically) written data that cannot be read. All discs have a very thin film of 
lubricant on them as protection from head-disc contact, but lubrication build-up on 





b) Data Written but Destroyed 
All previous RAID system reliability models presume that once written, the data 
will remain undestroyed except by degradation of the magnetic properties of the 
media (“bit-rot”). Media can degrade, but is inconsequential and failure for other 
reasons is much more probable. Data can become corrupted any time the discs are 
spinning, even when data is not being written to or read from the disc. Three common 
causes for erasure include thermal asperities, corrosion and scratches/smears. 
Thermal asperities (T/As) are instances of high heat for a short duration caused 
by head-disc contact. This is usually the result of heads hitting small “bumps” created 
by particles embedded in the media surface during the manufacturing process, even 
after burnishing and polishing the surfaces. The heat generated on a single contact 
may not be sufficient to thermally erase data, but may be sufficient after many 
contacts. 
Heads are designed to push particles away so they are not trapped between the 
head and disc surface, but particles do get caught there. Hard particles used in the 
manufacture of a HDD, such as Al2O3, TiW and C will cause surface scratches and 
data erasure. Other “soft” materials such as stainless steel can come from assembly 
tooling. Soft particles tend to smear across the surface of the media rendering the data 
unreadable. Corrosion, although carefully controlled, also can cause data erasure and 




Chapter 3  RAID System Architecture 
RAID is more than a simple N+1 or N+2 hardware redundancy. RAID allows 
data to become corrupted from partially failed HDDs as described by the failure 
modes in Section 2.4. This Chapter presents the general concept of RAID, the 
Berkeley taxonomy of RAID architectures, and a summary of how the HDD firmware 
and RAID operating system can correct corrupted data within an HDD and across 
HDDs in the RAID group. 
3.1 General RAID Concepts 
Redundant Arrays of Inexpensive Disks (RAID) are created to enhance data 
input/output (I/O) performance and reliability by grouping together multiple 
inexpensive disks rather than using one large disk. Multiple disks change the I/O from 
a serial data transfer process to a parallel transfer process. The I/O transfer rate is 
enhanced for small RAID group sizes, but can decrease as the group grows larger 
because of the increased time required to manage data locations and data flow. 
Systems are often composed of more than one RAID group and it is not uncommon to 
have one computer manage 2 to 20 RAID groups. 
Usually, RAID employs parity checking for data distributed across multiple disks 
and uses it to reconstruct data that has been corrupted or “lost” due to damaged or 
“defect-laden” disc media. Using parity across the data disks creates HDD 
redundancy because any amount of corrupted data on a single HDD can be 
reconstructed as long as all the data on all the other HDDs is uncorrupted. When a 




parity and stored at a new physical location on the HDD. If the data had been on a 
single HDD, corrupted data could not have been be recovered. Most frequently, small 
amounts of data are reconstructed and reallocated to new physical locations. 
3.2 RAID Definitions 
There are generally considered 7 levels of RAID, as summarized in Table 1, each 
having different properties in terms of latency, performance, reliability and a number 
of other attributes. Combinations of these levels result in RAID-10 and RAID-50. 
Paterson et al. [26] and Shooman [27] provide detailed discussions of RAID 
groupings and data storage patterns. RAID-0 is without redundancy, but may have 
data striped across multiple HDDs for performance reasons, and RAID-6 uses parity 
across multiple groups of HDDs to allow data recovery if two HDDs fail 
simultaneously [28]. RAID 6 effectively becomes an “N+2” logic. 
The most common implementation of RAID uses an “N+1” architecture in which 
N logical HDDs store data and 1 logical HDD holds parity. Note that parity bits may 
be restricted to a physically separate HDD, as in RAID-4, but are more likely 
intermingled with data. However, since the reliability logic is the same, it is easier to 
think of having N physical data HDDs and 1 physical parity HDD. Theoretically, 
there can be any number of data disks, but for performance groups of 4-16 are 
commonly used. The most reliable configuration achieves the redundancy with the 
fewest number of disks, meaning N + 1 = 2. This is also the most expensive in that 2 
disks are used to store the data of 1 disk, a 100% overhead in capacity. Increasing the 





Table 1 - RAID Designations 
Name Attributes 
RAID-0 Also known as just-a-
bunch-of-disks, or JBOD 
No redundancy. Data may be striped across more 
than one disk for performance reasons. Reliability 
is lower than a single disk. 
RAID-1 Mirrored disks Two physical disks that store identical copies of 
the data. Highly reliable, high performance, high 
cost. 
RAID-2 Hamming Error Code 
Correcting (ECC) with bit-level 
interleaving 
Single error correction capability with double 
error detection. ECC is striped across disks. Not 
used often because of reduced performance in 
determining ECC as compared to parity. 
RAID-3 Block based parity-bit 
codes 
Data-block based parity-bits are stored on a 
separate disk. 
RAID-4 Sector based parity-bit 
codes 
Sector based parity-bits stored on a separate disk. 
Data is striped across the other disks in the group. 
RAID-5 Sector based parity-bit 
codes 
Sector based parity-bits are striped across multiple 
disks along with the data. 
RAID-6 Dual parity Sector based parity-bits are derived from two 
different RAID groups. Slows performance but 
greatly improves reliability. 
 
 
Note that, statistically, there is also a limit for k-out-of-n redundancy called the 
“cross-over” point. Beyond this level of redundancy, the reliability of a single disk is 
greater than the reliability of the k-out-of-m system. For an N+1 system (k = N; m = 




Since the reliability changes in time, this may be difficult to evaluate and render 
a crossover point that changes in time. 


















3.3 Data Loss and Error Correction 
Error correcting codes (ECC) on the disk and parity across the disks is a common 
method to assure accurate data recording. ECC, often based on Reed-Solomon codes 
[27], uses Boolean operations to encode blocks of data, saving the resultant as well as 
the data. If bits are lost, the ECC is decoded to determine the value of the lost bit and 
data integrity is preserved. The strength of ECC is enhanced by interleaving multiple 
blocks of data so that if a large physical area of a disk (many bits) is not readable, the 
corrupted area does not affect all the data in a single block, but spreads the errors out 
over multiple blocks. The ECC must then correct multiple blocks, which is easier 
than recovering the same number of lost bits from a single block.  
Losing access to an HDD occurs when the supporting hardware or software 
prevents data from being written to or read from the disk. Examples include loss of 
electric power, failure of the processor or failure of the host-bus adapter. Once the 
support function is fully restored, the HDDs are accessible and, assuming graceful 
shutdown, the data on the disks remains uncorrupted and readable. Data loss occurs 
when the stored data has been corrupted to the point that on-board ECC and parity 
across disks cannot reconstruct the missing bits or when a catastrophic disk drive 
failure occurs. When one disk is in the reconstruct mode, a read error on any other 
HDD will result in lost data. Certain errors do not cause failure when all N+1 disks in 
the RAID group are fully functioning, but will cause failure if one disk has failed. 
A functional representation of RAID-4 with 3 data disks and one parity disk is 
shown in Figure 7. Parity of data stream “A” is computed and stored on disk 4 while 




data onto disk 3. The data striped across disks 1 and 2 and the parity for “A” on disk 4 
are used to reconstruct the data that was stored on disk 3. Many RAID systems have 
“hot plug” capability on the disks so that in the event of a complete disk failure, the 
failed disk can be removed, a new one installed and the data restored while 
continuing to process other data streams. Thus, very high data availability is 

















































































Chapter 4  Previous Work 
Currently, RAID reliability modeling is dominated by two methods. The mean 
time to data loss (MTTDL) is a closed form equation that attempts to estimate the 
mean time between double disk failures (DDFs). The Markov model is more 
complex, usually requires a computer to solve and produces a probability of double 
disk failure in a specified time. Both of these approaches and previously proposed 
enhancements are in Section 4.1. Discussion of the assumptions and errors inherent 
with these two methods are presented in Section 4.2. The new method proposed in 
this thesis appears in Chapter 6. 
4.1 MTTDL and Markov Models 
Most researchers ([3], [5], and [29] through [46]) use the same concepts and 
assumptions in assessing the reliability of RAID systems and develop a MTTDL. 
MTTDL attempts to estimate the average time between simultaneous failures of two 
hard disk drives in an N+1  RAID group, resulting in the inability to deliver data 
upon request. This method is predicated on the assumption that not only do all the 
HDDs in the RAID group follow a homogeneous Poisson process, but that the RAID 
system (composed of the N+1 HDDs) also follows a homogeneous Poisson process. 
Therefore, all HDDs in the RAID group are assumed to have the same constant 
failure rates, λ, and constant repair (restoration) rates, μ. The failure rate is assumed 













For these assumptions, a RAID group composed of N + 1 disks has a MTTDL 




Since the repair rate is usually much larger than the failure rate, the term (2N+1)λ 
in eq. 4 can be ignored and eq. 2 and eq. 3 can be substituted into eq. 4. The resultant 




At the system level, the assumption of a homogeneous Poisson process means the 
"system failure rate", λsyst(t), is constant and can be estimated by the reciprocal of the 
MTTDL. Then, the number of DDFs can be calculated by the product of λsyst(t) and 
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Based on eq. 6, the estimated number of failures for an MTTDL of 36,162 years 
(MTBF = 461,386 hrs; MTTR=12 hrs; N=7), 1000 RAID groups and 10 years of 






Markov models are an alternative approach to estimating RAID reliability. 
Generally, the major drawback of Markov models is their high level of complexity. A 
basic Markov model for a k-out-of-n system is not difficult to create or evaluate if all 
the HDDs failure rates are constant and the same value, all repair rates are constant 
and the same value, and the repair strategy is simple. In Chapter 5, however, it will be 
shown that HDDs rarely have constant failure rates. The model logic itself, discussed 
in Chapter 6, will illustrate why the repair and restoration rates are not constant. 
Inclusion of delay times, the location parameter in a Weibull distribution, adds 
significant model complexity. In such a delay time, the probability of restoration is 
zero. For HDDs there is a minimum amount of time required to reconstruct the data 
on the HDD based on the number of HDDs on the bus, the capacity of the HDDs, the 
maximum sustained data rate and the amount of foreground simultaneous I/O. 
A Markov model calculates the probability of one or more failures during the 
mission time, but the expected number of failures is not calculated. Estimates of the 
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units at risk at the beginning of the mission. Thus, at any point in time, ti, the number 
of failures is computed. 
Numerous researchers have evaluated the MTTDL method and a few have 
identified problems, yet failed to develop a new model to correct the issues. Malhotra 
[36] recognized that MTTDL is the metric commonly used to assess reliability, but 
acknowledged that mean values are not as interesting to system users as the 
probability of failing in a specific time frame. He states “...transient solution is of 
more interest than steady state solution.” Malhotra introduces several new metrics, 
including L(t), the probability that no data loss has occurred until time t. While 
Malhotra’s thesis offers insights for complex modeling of fault tolerant systems, he 
resorts to constant failure rates and evaluates the RAID system using Markov models. 
Kari [3] shows the importance of latent fault detection and its effect on the 
reliability and data availability of disk arrays. He proposed analytic methods, 
measurements on existing systems, and reliability simulations as possibilities to 
assess the MTTDL and data availability. He has a brief table of failure modes and 
causes, but his list omitted several important causes of disk drive failure which should 
be modeled. While Kari provides a different view of Markov analyses with 
improvements, his basic assumptions are the same as all others and he arrives at the 
same point, constant failure rates and MTTDL. 
Kari, as with most other researchers listed earlier, incorrectly assumes the 
deterioration of the magnetic media is independent of the usage. This means that 
operations of reading from and writing to the disk will not cause the media to 




termed "bit-rot", a degradation in the magnetic properties in the media causing areas 
previously unread and unwritten to become faulty. He assumes that the heads do not 
touch the media during use and overlooks many of the causes discussed in previous 
sections. 
Courtright [32] acknowledges that disk drive failure rates may not be constant 
and cites the International Disk Equipment Materials Association (IDEMA) standard 
[33] for specifying disk drive reliability based on non-constant failure rates. However, 
he then assumes constant failure rates throughout his paper and asserts that MTTDL 
is an insightful metric.  
Geist and Trivedi [34] use Markov models and constant transition rates, but add 
an interesting insight. They assume that the failure rate for the second failure is higher 
than that for the first failure, although still constant. While this is an interesting 
approach, there is little justification for it from a failure cause perspective. Their 
discussion includes only non-redundant disks as compared to mirrored disks. In spite 
of these research efforts, their model again assumes constant failure rates. 
More recently Schwarz et al. [5] recognized the problems with undiscovered 
(latent) data corruptions and developed a model that includes scrubbing for an 
archival storage system. As other researchers, however, they assume constant failure 
rates and constant repair rates, a HPP at the system level, and calculate a mean time to 
data loss as the reciprocal of the "failure rate". While providing interesting 
approaches to modeling latent defects and alternative scrubbing strategies for a 
massive array of independent disks (MAID), the paper contains the same statistical 




multiplying a failure rate by time and asserting the result is a failure rate. The 
approximate equivalence between probability and frequency, shown in [5] is used 
without checking its validity (see eq. 8). The system modeled is a "two-way mirroring 
system with N disk drives"; a far simpler model than the RAID system considered for 
this new model. 
 
eq. 8 
4.2 Assumptions and Errors in Past RAID Models 
In nearly all past RAID reliability models, the emphasis has been placed on 
either the mean time to data loss (MTTDL) or the probability of failure in some time 
period. However, the expected number of failures as a function of time is more 
insightful to everyone from the engineers designing RAID systems, to the executives 
trying to understand unhappy customers, to the service personnel who are asked 
whether a particular number of failures is higher than expected. For both the MTTDL 
and the probability of failure, (erroneous) assumptions are made in order to calculate 
the expected number of failures. Neither of these methods really solves the problem 
of determining the cumulative number of double disk failures as a function of time. 
While all attempt to do so, this section will illustrate the statistical errors inherent in 
their efforts. 
The greatest fallacy that afflicts all the analyses to date is the assumption that the 
system follows a homogeneous Poisson process (HPP). This significance of this 
fallacy is followed closely by the assumption that individual HDDs have constant 
failure rates and that repair/restorations have constant rates and unbounded durations. 




It is important to spend a fair amount of time understanding these assumptions and 
their consequences. These three assumptions introduce error in the estimated number 
of system failures based on MTTDL and Markov models.  
The goal of this thesis is not to derive new mathematics or statistics, but to use 
those already derived and apply them to develop a new, novel RAID reliability 
model. Therefore, this section provides conclusions from authorities Ascher in [47] - 
[52], Thompson in [53], Nelson in [54], and Crow in [55]. In the following 
discussion, I draw heavily on their expertise, statements and examples to support 
these concepts.  
4.2.1 Hazard Rate versus Rate of Occurrence of Failure 
To set the stage for discussions in sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, I must first elaborate 
on the distinction between "failure rate" and "rate of occurrence of failure" (ROCOF). 
For a set of observed times to failure having a probability density function, f(t), the 




If the cumulative distribution function (CDF) is known, the probability density 









    










When h(t) is independent of time, it is often referred to as the failure rate.  
The failures of a system are described by a stochastic point process [52]. The 
time based number of failures is N(t). The mean cumulative number of failures for the 








The hazard (failure) rate and ROCOF represent two very different concepts. The 
hazard rate, h(ti), at time ti, is a property of a time to failure distribution, related 
through both the pdf and CDF of the distribution. The ROCOF is a property of a 
sequence of times to failure [48]. However, under certain specific conditions, they are 
numerically the same [47]. This leads to confusion between the two and misuse of 
hazard rate instead of ROCOF. This research draws on the distinction and develops a 
model method consistent with cumulative number of failures, N(t), and the ROCOF, 
v(t). This research focuses on the ROCOF for determining the number of DDFs. 
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If a large number of similar components (HDDs, perhaps) are tested to failure, 
the CDF and pdf can be determined. The pdf and CDF for these components are 
based on the components themselves. There is no logical organization among them, 
such as simple redundancy, m-out-of-n, or conditional order of occurrence. If these 
failures follow a homogeneous Poisson process, the times from the start of the test 
until failure will be independent and identically distributed (iid), follow an 
exponential distribution and will have a constant hazard rate, λ. The MTBF will be 
the reciprocal of the hazard rate. 
Now consider a system composed of a single component. Each time the 
component fails, a new component sampled from the original pdf is inserted and the 
system is once again operative. It should be apparent that each sample is iid. The 
system is completely restored to an as-good-as-new condition because the new 
component fails according to the exact same distribution. Since each component is 
drawn from the same distribution with mean 1/λ, the mean time to failure for the 
system will also be 1/λ. This is an example of a HPP process. Notice that the mean 
for the components is the same as the mean for the system. 
Consider the same system as described above, but instead of a single component, 
there are multiple components in series, all drawn from the same distribution. This 
system will exhibit the same characteristics as the single component system. The 
observed m sequential times to failure (inter-arrival times) for the system are 
essentially the same as m observations from an exponential distribution, because, in 
each case the m observations are statistically independent observations from an 




no time memory to the system and probability of failing in any interval, Δt, is 
constant. This is a homogeneous Poisson process. This is the ONLY set of conditions 
in which the ROCOF will be numerically equivalent to the hazard rate of the 
components and order of occurrence is not important. 
When analyzing the data, the times between failures are ordered smallest to 
largest, and a distribution is fit to the data. The HPP exists only when the inter-arrival 
times are iid. Consider a set of data used by Ascher [47] as an example of a repairable 
system. He lists five inter-arrival times for system failure: 
 
14, 34, 42, 72, and 244 hours. 
 
If ordered as above, an exponential distribution will fit the data. Suppose the 






In the first case, the time between failures is increasing. In the second, the time 
between failures is decreasing. In the third, it does not appear to be either increasing 
or decreasing. So, while order is not important for determining a pdf, the mean, and 
failure rate for the components, order is critical for accurately understanding the 




4.2.2 Non-Homogeneous Processes 
A process is said to be a HPP when the probability of experiencing a specific 
number of failures, N, in a specific time interval, (t, t + x), does not depend on time, t. 
It is proportional to t through a constant, λ, where 0 < λ < ∞. Thompson expresses it 




Put another way, a process is HPP if and only if the times between failures are 
independent and with common exponential distribution. Components with constant 
failure rates may, depending on system logic, result in a ROCOF that follows a HPP. 
However, components with time dependent hazard rates (e. g., Weibull) will not 
result in a HPP and will not have a constant ROCOF. Weibull distributed times to 
failure are not iid, but inter-arrival times must be iid for the ROCOF to be a HPP. 
Extensive field reliability data, which will be presented in great detail in Chapter 
5, shows that HDD hazard rates are rarely constant. Furthermore, the HDDs in a 
RAID system often come from different vintages from the same supplier as well as 
different suppliers. Even if all HDDs were all exponentially distributed but with 
different hazard rates, the system would exhibit a decreasing failure rate [56] and, 
therefore, not follow the rules for HPP. It has been found that HDD failure 
distributions are often mixtures of distributions, resulting from some HDD sub-
populations having failure mechanisms that other sub-populations do not have, even 
though the sub-populations are the same model from the same manufacturer, but 




different vintage. An example of this is the failures caused by air borne 
contamination. When a HDD is closed up in the clean-room, it either does or does not 
contain large quantities of contaminants. Those that do often fail earlier than those 
that do not have contaminants, rendering an early wear-out mechanism for a 
subpopulation of HDDs. 
In addition to HDD times to failure following a NHPP, the system failure logic 
(architecture) must be examined. A RAID system always has some level of 
redundancy, N+1 in the cases we are considering. Even if all the components in a 
redundant system have constant failure rates, the system does not. Consider three 
simple configurations in which success is defined by the following: 
• one-out-of-one 
• one-out-of-two, and 
• two-out-of-three. 
 
Table 2 shows the hazard rate for three configurations. When all the constituent 
elements of the system have constant failure rates, only the serial system (reliability-
wise) has a constant failure rate. In the 1-out-of-2 and 2-out-of-3 systems, the hazard 
rates are time dependent; therefore, the systems do not have constant failure rates and 
do not conform to the requirements for a HPP. However, the mean time to failure is 
not time dependent, and the failure rate is not the reciprocal of the MTBF as is clear 
from a review of Table 2. RAID systems under consideration in this thesis require n-






Table 2 - Hazard Rates for Three Different Levels of Redundancy 
# of units 
required 
and total 
R(t) E(t) h(t) 
1 out of 1    
1 out of 2    
2 out of 3    
 
4.2.3 Errors Resulting from the HPP Assumption 
To date, all RAID analyses provide estimates of MTTDL or the probability of 
failure (Markov models), and the concepts of failure rate and ROCOF are 
interchanged. Sequence is ignored and component concepts are used on the system. 
Under a HPP, the expected rate of failure, v(t), is constant and numerically equal to 
the component failure rate, λ, and the two are interchanged. From renewal theory, the 
expected number of failures for a single system is λt and for n replications, nλt. 
Under the non-Homogeneous Poisson Process (NHPP), the cumulative number 
of failures follows a Poisson distribution, but the mean, E[N(t)], is not proportional to 




Ascher [47] summarized it best stating, there is little connection between the 
properties of component hazard rates and the properties of the process that produces a 
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rate has no connection with the tendency for times between successive failures (at the 
system level) to become smaller (larger) [50]. Furthermore, times between successive 
system failures can become increasingly larger even though each component hazard 
rate is increasing [48]. In another publication [52] he goes on to explain that for a 
NHPP, the inter-arrival times do not come from a single distribution so it is 
meaningless to even try to fit a distribution to them or calculate mean and variance.  
Since estimates of V(t) using the MTTDL and Markov models are based on the 
invalid assumption of HPP for the system, the results are questionable, at best. The 
component failure rates are not constant, the ROCOF of the system is not constant 
and the system ROCOF is not the reciprocal of the MTBF (MTTDL). Markov models 
are no better than MTTDL at resolving problems associated with assuming HPP for 
the system. Thompson [57] provides an important observation relative to using 
probability to assess E[N(t)]. Again using a life distribution with pdf of f(t), the 
probability of failure before some time, t, is described by the CDF (see eq. 9). He then 
notes that the number of components that fail as a function of time, N(t), is a random 




For a binomial distribution, the expected value, E[N(t)] = nF(t). However, 
replacing E[N(t)] with nF(t) and dividing by n leads to an interesting observation. 
Differentiating V(t) to get the ROCOF results in the expression shown in eq. 17. 
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This is density function, not a hazard rate! So the ROCOF cannot be determined by 
using nF(t). This is the process used when Markov models are employed. 











Chapter 5  Realities of Field Data 
Numerous data sets for HDDs used in RAID systems in the field were analyzed 
to better understand the potential impact of real data on the model. The results 
confirm that the assumption of constant HDD failure rates in RAID systems must be 
revised. Some of the results have been published [58], [59], [60], [61], [62], and [63], 
and new data analyses are included to provide new insights. This section provides 
examples of analyses to illustrate the following points: 
 
• Failure rates are usually not constant in time 
• Failure distributions depend on manufacturers 
• Failure distributions change as a function of manufacturing vintage 
• Failure distributions are affected by RAID architecture and recovery techniques  
• Failure distributions are often mixtures of multiple distributions which are 
difficult to segregate into the constituent distributions 
 
When one compares the following results to the manufacturers' advertised 
"MTBFs", you will find great differences between the two. Knowing that HDD 
failure distributions usually do not have constant failure rates invalidates the MTTDL 
and Markov models used to date and the failure rate times time calculation used to 
determine numbers of failures using these two methods. The data presented below 
provide the basis for better DDF estimates using the model presented in Chapter 6 




In general, failure rates are dynamic throughout the HDD life as well as the 
production life. Much of the data presented to illustrate this is for significant 
subpopulations over a significant time. These numbers do not represent an entire 
product line and should not be interpreted as representative of all the HDDs in a 
particular system, although any specific system may be composed of HDDs from a 
specific manufacturing vintage. Two systems of the same make and model sitting side 
by side in a user environment may consist of a highly reliable "angelic" system and a 
very unreliable "evil twin" because of the difference in composition of HDDs. The 
significance of this data is to provide justification that failure rates are generally not 
constant and that "evil twin" systems can be a reality.   
5.1 The Bathtub Myth 
In most text books, it is stated that component failures follow a "bathtub" curve. 
First, the "infant mortality" portion starts at time zero and has a decreasing failure 
rate. When the hardware prone to early life failures diminishes significantly, the 
"useful life" begins, wherein the failure rate fairly constant. At some point "wear-out" 
begins and the failure rate begins to increase. The bathtub curve is actually not a 
single distribution, but is composed of three different distributions. The three 
theoretic segments are shown in Figure 9. As will be seen in Section 5.2 through 5.5, 
HDD field data does not match the theory. Significant findings are as follows: 
 
• Decreasing HDD failure rates in the short term 
• Decreasing failure rates after many months/years of increasing failure rates 
















Figure 9 - The Theoretic Bathtub Curve 
This shows the theoretic failure rate as a function of time 
 
5.2 The Importance of Vintage Analyses 
Vintage analyses are especially effective in discerning the effects of design or 
manufacturing process changes over time. Significant design changes in HDDs are 
infrequently introduced after mass production begins because customers must re-
qualify the products, a very expensive and time consuming endeavor. However, small 
manufacturing process changes occur on a regular basis to enhance manufacturing 
yields. Yield improvements are readily apparent on a weekly basis, during which a 































yields, but only after significant design changes are hundreds of HDDs run through 
weeks of reliability testing to verify improvements or even the lack of degradation. 
The definition of a vintage is rather arbitrary but can be viewed as a change that 
affects the entire subpopulation of HDDs as a function of build date. If significant 
design or manufacturing process changes are implemented, HDDs produced before 
and after the change are reasonable vintage groups. For the data analysis shown in 
Figure 10, there were no significant changes as confirmed by the manufacturer. In 
these analyses, it was found that a population of 10,000 to 15,000 HDDs provided a 














Figure 10 - Weibull Plot of Combined Vintages 
  






























Since the monthly usage exceeded 10,000 HDDs, monthly shipments sufficed as 
the definition of a vintage. The plot contains three months of production combined. 
The data are plotted in red as individual failure times and the straight black line is the 
"best fit" using the Maximum Likelihood Method (MLE). MLE is preferred over 
rank-regression because of the high number of right-censored HDDs. The data 
appears to have a slight "s-shape" to it. The single Weibull distribution with the 
calculated slope of 1.2 is not an especially good fit. This data was then divided into 
three constituent vintages, each one month in duration and the three vintages are 














Figure 11 - Weibull Plot of Three Constituent Vintages 
 





































In Figure 11, note that the three months all have significantly different slopes, β, 
and characteristic lives, η. Even when 90% confidence limits were placed on the data, 
there is a statistical difference between the three lines. On the right side of the plots, 
"S" indicates the number of HDDs censored (succeeded) in the population and "F" 
indicates the number failed. The parameters of the three distributions are shown 
below the plot. One line is nearly exponential, for which β = 1.0. The other two are 
increasing failure rates with β = 1.3 and β = 1.4. The percent of HDDs that will fail in 
1 year (8760 hours) is 1.4, 2.9 and 4.1 respectively for these parameters. While 
vintage 1 has a fairly constant failure rate, both vintages 2 and 3 have increasing 
failure rates or wear-out within the first 30 days of usage. 
Figure 12 shows another three vintages. Again, two of the slopes (β's) indicate 
increasing failure rates while the third is nearly 1.0, indicating a fairly constant failure 
rate.  
Observation #1: HDD failure distributions can vary significantly from month to 
month even for the same HDD from the same manufacturer. 
 
Observation #2: "Infant" wear-out is observer in two of the vintages. Wear-out is 























Figure 12 - Second Group of Vintages 
 
5.3 Competing Risks versus Distribution Mixtures in Data 
When all units in a population can fail from any of several causes, the causes are 
said to present competing risks. The reliability for the unit is the product of the 
reliabilities due to each of the causes. For n different failure mechanisms, m, the 














































The HDD population in Figure 13 shows the effects of competing risks. All the 
HDDs were subject to the same failure mechanisms. Early in their life, mode "A" 
dominated and later mode "B" dominated. The failure analyses shows that nearly all 
HDDs will suffer from this long-term wear-out phenomenon related to lube buildup 
on the heads causing high-fly writes. This population does not exhibit an initially 
decreasing failure rate as in the bath-tub curve, but it does exhibit useful life and 
(long-term) wear-out. This population did not contain distinctive vintages in 
subpopulations. Extrapolation of the percent to fail will follow an extension of the 














Figure 13 - Plot Showing Competing Risks (No Vintage Effects) 
  












































5.4 Mixtures of Distributions 
Figure 14 shows a plot of a single HDD product from a single supplier. When the 
population is taken as a whole, denoted as "composite" in the figure, it shows a 
distinctly increasing failure rate that tends to diminish until, in the later times, it has a 
decreasing failure rate3. When segregated into five vintages, also plotted in Figure 14, 
all vintages exhibit similar behavior. This indicates that all vintages contain at least 















Figure 14 - Data Plot Showing "Distribution Mixtures" 
                                                 
3 When plotted on linear paper, a slope greater than 1.0 indicates an increasing failure rate. If 
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Failure analyses by the HDD manufacturer showed these characteristics resulted 
from the manufacturing process in which some HDDs contained high levels of 
contamination when the cover was put on and some did not. Those with higher levels 
of contamination followed an "infant wear-out" distribution and those with lower 
levels of contamination had either a constant or decreasing failure rate4. Thus, some 
fraction of all HDDs on any given day had excessive levels of contamination. These 
distinct distributions in the population render what is termed "mixed distributions". 
5.5 Highly Complex Distributions 
In general, I tried to fit data first to Weibull distributions because of its 
flexibility. Under some circumstances it is difficult to discern the difference between 
a Weibull and ln-Normal distribution, but from a Weibull it is easy to determine 
whether the failure rate is increasing, constant or decreasing. Figure 15 shows some 
very complex distributions. Clearly, only one is even close to a Weibull distribution. 
The other two contain mixtures of distributions, competing risks and vintage changes. 
Population HDD #3 initially has a fairly constant failure rate. It then exhibits a 
decreasing failure rate followed by a strongly increasing failure rate. This product 
experienced a design change that substantially improved its head reliability (sub-
population with much higher reliability) but then all the HDD heads are subject to 
lube build-up and high-fly writes.  
 
                                                 
4 Proschan [56] demonstrated that a population consisting of two subpopulations, both with constant 
failure rates, will exhibit what appeared to be a decreasing failure rate. As the units with the higher 
failure rate fail, the remaining population has a higher proportion of units with the lower failure rate. 
Unless specifically analyzed to discern the truth, it is not possible to tell whether the HDDs with low 
contamination levels were truly decreasing or whether the remaining population appeared to have a 

















Figure 15 - Three Separate Populations: Two are Complex 
 
5.6 Data Summary 
The data presented are a significant contribution to the knowledge of HDD 
failure distributions.  Based on my literature search, I could find no other HDD data 
analyses that clearly illustrate the distributions and the effects of vintage, mixtures, 
contamination, and wear-out. These data clearly show that the assumption of a 
constant failure rate over the life of the product is generally invalid. Most 
subpopulations analyzed do not have a constant failure rate. In fact, throughout the 





















































different products (excluding capacity differences), constant failure rates are rarely 
seen, even in monthly vintages. 
The significance of this observation is essential to this thesis. Lack of constant 
failure rates at the HDD level negates the ubiquitous assumption that the system will 
follow a homogeneous Poisson process. This assumption appears, either implicitly or 
explicitly, in all other RAID system analyses. The rest of this thesis is devoted to 
understanding the significance of this finding by developing a model that includes 
non-constant failure rates, non-constant repair/restoration rates and accounts for a 
variable scrubbing of latent defects. 
 
Observation #3: Vintage differences can result from either competing failure 
mechanisms or "mixtures" of mechanisms. 
 
Observation #4: Complex distributions can result from mixtures of causes that 
cannot be segregated. The HDD failure rate does not follow a closed form distribution 




Chapter 6  New Model Logic 
The bases for needing a new RAID reliability model are presented in Chapter 4 
and Chapter 5. At the heart of the errors are the non-inclusion of latent defects and the 
assumption that the HDD failures and repairs, and the RAID group (as a system) 
failures and restorations, all follow a homogeneous Poisson process. This Chapter 
presents the new model that accounts allows the HDD failures to follow a non-HPP, 
incorporates the logic resulting from the failure modes and mechanisms identified 
earlier, and incorporates operating policies such as "scrubbing" durations. This 
Chapter begins with some definitions (6.1), describes a common operational profile 
for the RAID group (6.2), the model logic (6.3), the model in detail (6.4) and finally 
the transition distributions (6.5). 
6.1 Definitions 
There are no “standard” definitions for many of the terms used in describing 
HDD failures. However a consistent set of terms is paramount in creating a model. 
This paper uses the following definitions. 
Correctable Data Errors: Corrupted data that can be corrected by using the 
HDD’s onboard Error Correction Code (ECC) algorithms. “On-the-fly” corrections 
can be performed for small errors (few bytes) in less than a revolution. Somewhat 
larger data corruptions, 20-80 bytes, require more calculation time to correct and so 




require RAID for data recovery. These are typically, SCSI5 “01” codes, such as 01-17 
and 01-18. Correctable errors are not part of the RAID reliability calculation. 
Uncorrectable Data Errors: Corrupted data that cannot be corrected using the 
HDD’s onboard ECC algorithms, off-track (offset) reads, parametric changes to the 
heads, and numerous other methods to recover data. Typically these are SCSI “03” 
errors, such as 03-03, 03-11, 03-0C and 03-13.  
Recoverable Data: Uncorrectable Data Errors that are recoverable at the system 
level using the remaining HDDs in the RAID group, including parity data. Data 
recovered at the RAID level is rewritten to the same drive that had the error, but to a 
physically different location. The offending location and some amount of “track 
padding” are logically mapped out, never to be used again. 
Latent Defects: Data with undetected defects (data corruption) in the media. 
Since data corruption is not discovered until the data is read, it may be corrupt and 
either undiscovered or discovered but uncorrected. Both of these constitute a latent 
defect. Latent defects contain uncorrectable, recoverable or unrecoverable data and 
may be due to poor writing, bad media or post-writing corruption. 
Operational Faults: (Hardware) Faults (errors) in which data or servo tracks 
cannot be read even if the data is not corrupted (SCSI code 04). Typically, this 
requires a hardware failure, such as a failed head or bad motor bearing, lubrication 
buildup on a head or electronic circuitry failure. These errors can occur during a read 
or write. Staying on-track requires the following to be good: media servo tracks, 
                                                 




read/write heads, motor bearings, and numerous electronic components. Even during 
a “write” the servo track must be read, so inability to read servo tracks will result in 
an operational failure. Operational errors do not include defective media or corrupted 
data. 
Media Defect: A part of a disc surface that has a physical condition such as 
scratch, bump (from contamination buried in the media), or a pit that either prevents 
data from being written correctly or results in erasure or corruption of data after being 
written. For this research, all media defects have corrupted data or will not allow data 
to be written without becoming corrupted. 
Reallocation: If corrupted data can be recovered using RAID, the bad sectors on 
the affected disk are mapped out and the data is saved in a new location on the disk. 
Reconstruction: If a HDD is no longer able to read or write data (operational 
error or SMART threshold exceeded), all the data on the affected HDD is 
reconstructed from parity and the rest of the HDDs in the RAID group and written on 
a spare HDD. 
6.2 System Operation Profiles 
Most HDD manufacturers agree that system operation can greatly affect HDD 
reliability. However, none has developed a verifiable relationship between the various 
kinds of use and the effects on reliability. That is, HDD reliability is affected by the 
length (number of successive blocks) of writes and whether they are sequentially or 
randomly written. This research assumes that order of operation (sequential versus 




length all affect reliability, but their effects are averaged out over the all customer use 
profiles. Therefore, these effects are inherently contained in the field data collected at 
the HDD level.  
A. All System Operating Profiles: 
Systems are fully utilized 24 hours per day, 365 days per year and are rarely 
stopped. This is common practice in the business critical applications in the United 
States. In other countries, the systems are sometimes turned off during off-peak hours 
and over some fraction of the weekends to conserve electricity. 
Data written to HDDs are not checked for integrity after writing. This is done to 
enhance performance. Write errors are not identified until the next time the data is 
read. Recoverable errors can be corrected using all the remaining disks in the RAID 
group. Unrecoverable errors cannot be corrected even using the other disks in the 
RAID group, either because it is an “operational defect” or because the required data 
is not available on the remaining RAID disks (one HDD has already failed or the 
specific data necessary to correct has also been corrupted). ALL data on ALL other 
HDDs are required to reconstruction of a full HDD in a RAID group.  
Total number of operational disks in a RAID group is N+1. The capacity 
equivalent of one HDD is required for parity. So, whether RAID-4 or RAID-5, all 
data is stored on N HDDs, the minimum number required to serve data per 
specification. All HDDs experience the same workload. No HDD (even in RAID-4) is 
used significantly more than any other, so all HDDs in a RAID group have the same 
failure distributions, although the model is capable of changing the failure distribution 




Adjacent track interference is not considered in this analysis. Data may be wholly 
contained on a single HDD or striped across HDDs. Parity is calculated based on 
physical HDD blocks, so the location of the file and the amount of striping is not 
important. Location of data is striped solely for performance reasons. 
B. Spares: 
Availability of spares affects the “at risk” time when one HDD in the RAID 
group has failed. Having a spare HDD in the system and operating means that the 
delay time to begin reconstruction can be treated as “zero”. However, "hot-standby" 
spares are spinning and the heads are moving so they can induce media defects, 
damage heads and experience all types of operational failures. Operational failures 
are readily detected and replaced, but they are not part of the cut-sets for the model.  
Latent defects in the media of a spare HDD do not cause HDD failure. Data is 
written to a location with defective media just as any other data-write to a HDD. 
Spares with latent media defects do not fail a reconstruction during a “write” unless 
the defect is in an area used to simply stay on track, such as a servo block. 
Operational failure of a spare will prevent reconstruction but otherwise not affect any 
data on the other HDDs in the RAID group. 
C. Attributes during reconstruction: 
During reconstruction, 100% of all idle time is spent on reconstructing data on 
the “new” HDD. The RAID group is still processing I/O commands and serving data 
as requested. When I/O and reconstruction occur simultaneously, the reconstruction 
uses 40% of the HDD bandwidth, 40% of the I/O bus bandwidth, or 40% of the cpu 




New (additional) data may be stored completely on one of the original RAID 
group HDDs or striped across other HDDs, including the one under reconstruction. 
During reconstruction, the entire HDD is reconstructed, even the blocks that have no 
useful data. Since the HDD may be “zeroed” before it leaves the integrator’s factory, 
parity should always be valid. 
During reallocation or reconstruction, corrupted data may be written to the new 
sectors or HDD. If a bad block is read from one of the HDDs being used for 
reconstruction the reconstructed HDD contains corrupted data but is not immediately 
failed. The bad data block is tagged as questionable. If the data on that block is 
rewritten (updated) before it is read, then the data is no longer “bad”, no data is lost 
and the HDD is not considered as failed. However, if the bad sector on the newly 
reconstructed HDD is read before being re-written, then the block is considered bad, 
the data is corrupted and the HDD fails. This model assumes that locations with latent 
media defects will be read before being rewritten. 
D. Latent Defect Scrubbing: 
Latent data corruptions that have occurred during operation (reading, writing or 
spinning - since spinning can cause T/A’s and corrupt data) can be discovered by 
scrubbing. Scrubbing is a process in which data is read and compared to the parity. If 
they are consistent, no action is taken. If they are inconsistent, the corrupted data is 
recovered and rewritten to the same physical location on the HDD or, if the media is 
defective, the recovered data is written to new physical sectors on the HDD and the 




Scrubbing is a background activity performed on an as-possible basis so it does 
not affect system performance. The time required to scrub an entire HDD is a random 
variable that depends on the HDD capacity and the amount of foreground activity. 
During times of heavy I/O the scrubbing rate may not keep up with the bit error rate 
(BER) or added media defects (from T/As, etc). So, time to completely scrub may be 
very lengthy. It is possible that the BER is so high that new errors are being added to 
the data at a faster rate than the scrubbing is removing them. 
Scrubbing can prevent latent defects from being discovered during a full HDD 
reconstruction, but does not reduce the number of latent media errors that occur 
throughout the life of the HDD. By recovering corrupted data before a reconstruction, 
latent media defect related double-disk failures are reduced. Since scrubbing requires 
reading and writing data, scrubbing acts as time to failure accelerator for HDD 
components with usage dependent time to failure distributions. For example, if 
scrubbing causes the slider to move too slowly across the disc surface, disc 
lubrication can build up on the head causing it to fly too high above the media. If the 
head is too high when performing a write, the magnetic field strength in the written 
media can be too low to be read. 
From a modeling perspective, scrubbing reduces the opportunities for latent 
defects to accumulate, thus reducing the probability of failure during reconstruction. 
If not scrubbed, the period of time to accumulate latent defects starts when the HDD 
first begins operation in the system and depends on BER and amount of data 





6.3 Model Logic 
In RAID-4 and RAID-5 configurations, a single additional HDD within the 
RAID group is employed for redundancy. As part of the write process, an “exclusive 
OR” calculation generates parity bits that are also written to the RAID group. Error 
correcting codes (ECC) on the HDD, and parity across the HDDs is a common 
method to assure accurate data transfer and recording. ECC uses Boolean operations 
to encode blocks of data, interleaving the data and the ECC bits. On each read 
command, user data and ECC are read. If inconsistent, the data is corrected on the fly 
(less than one revolution), data integrity preserved and performance is not degraded. 
ECC strength is enhanced by interleaving multiple blocks of data so that if a large 
physical area of a disk (many bits) is not readable, it does not affect all the data in a 
single block, but spreads the errors out over multiple blocks. ECC is faster than data 
recovery across multiple HDDs, but since ECC is read with every block of user data, 
excessive ECC use can degrade performance. 
Losing access to a HDD occurs when the supporting hardware or software 
prevents data from being written to or read from the disk. Examples include loss of 
electric power, failure of the processor or failure of the host-bus adapter. Once the 
support function is fully restored, the HDDs are accessible and, assuming graceful 
shutdown upon loss of the support function, the data on the disks remains uncorrupted 
and readable. This model does not consider lost access, but focuses on data loss. 
There are four distributions to consider based on observed HDD failure modes 
and mechanisms and common system operating rules; 1) time to operational failure, 




recovery (through scrubbing). System failure occurs when two HDDs fail 
simultaneously. An operational failure (Op) is one in which no data anywhere on the 
HDD can be read, even though the data may have no defect whatsoever. Removal and 
replacement of the HDD is the only resolution to an operational failure. Latent defect 
(Ld) refers to unknown or undetected data corruption. Latent defects can exist 
because either the data was not written well initially or the data was destroyed after 
successfully being written to the disc. 
Poorly written data can be a result of the inherent bit-error rate (BER), but this 
has been determined to be a second order effect. More likely, data is poorly written 
because of high-fly writes or other head related magnetic, electrical or mechanical 
problems. Data is often destroyed after being successfully and properly written. This 
can be the result of contaminants buried in the coatings on the media surface, loose 
contamination within the HDD enclosure, or thermal erasures from brief or repeated 
head-disc contacts. 
Remedies for latent defects occur only upon reading the corrupted data and rely 
on reading the data on all other HDDs in the RAID group and the associated parity 
bits to reconstruct the lost data. If small amounts of data are lost, the reconstructed 
data is physically written to another good section of the HDD and the faulty section is 
mapped out to prevent reuse. When a HDD is removed due to an operational failure, 
this same process is used to reconstruct all the data lost on the failed HDD. MTTDL 
calculations include only a single failure rate for all HDD failures and a single repair 




A significant modeling difference results from the order of occurrence for latent 
and operational failures. Latent defects go undiscovered until the corrupted data is 
read. Only at that time is the data corrected through use of the parity bits. Data that is 
not read remains in a corrupted state indefinitely. If an operational failure occurs after 
the existence of a latent defect on any other HDD, the data cannot be reconstructed on 
the replacement HDD because data required is corrupted or missing. Thus, a latent 
defect followed by an operational failure results in a double disk failure (DDF).  
While the HDD experiencing reconstruction may suffer write errors, these will 
be corrected during the next read or remain as latent defects. Their creation during the 
reconstruction does not constitute a DDF. The probability of suffering a usage related 
data corruption in an unread area during the time of reconstruction is small, so DDFs 
do not occur during reconstructions. Multiple HDDs with latent defects do not 
constitute DDF unless they happen to coexist within the same block of data across 
more than one HDD, also an extremely low probability event which is not included in 
the model. 
In recent years, the problem of latent defects has been recognized by some 
system integrators and been significantly reduced by data “scrubbing” [5]. During 
scrubbing, data on the HDD is read and checked against its parity bits even though 
the data is not being requested by the user. The corrupt data is corrected, bad spots on 
the media are mapped out and the data is saved to good locations on the HDD. Since 
this is done as a background activity and does not impede performance, it is rather 




permit. But, depending on the foreground I/O demand and the HDD capacity, it also 
may take weeks or months to complete the scrub. 
In summary, the two conditions that result in a DDF are two simultaneous 
operational failures and an operational failure that occurs after a latent defect has 
been introduced and before it is corrected. Simultaneous latent defects do not 
constitute failure. This conditionality is not considered in MTTDL or the Markov 
models reviewed. 
6.4 Model Description 
The model logic is partially depicted in Figure 16. While this logic appears to 
represent a Markov model, it certainly is not evaluated as a Markov model. The 
notation of distributions and transitions from state to state is generic. Evaluation 
process and the Monte Carlo simulation will be described later. In State 1, the data 
and parity HDDs are good, there are no latent defects and a spare HDD is available. 
State 2 represents the condition in which 1 or more HDDs have developed latent 
defects. The transition from State 1 is a function of the N+1 HDDs developing a 
latent defect according to the failure distribution, dLd. From State 2, an operational 
failure in any of the N HDDs other than the one with the latent defect results in State 
3, a DDF state. The transition from State 2 to 3 occurs in accord with the operational 
failure distribution dOp. 
Transition from State 2 to State 4 occurs when media defects become so 
prevalent on the HDD which had the latent media/data defect, that the HDD causes a 
time-out for the system while trying to reallocate large numbers of defective blocks, 




exceeded. In this transition massive media problems render the HDD as inoperative, 
just like any other operational failure. The frequency of transition from state 2 to state 
4 is included in the Operational failure distribution dOp. A third transition from State 2 




























Figure 16 - State Diagram for N+1 RAID Group 
 
 
State 4, the second possible transition from State 1, represents one operational 
failure. The transition to this state from State 1 is based on the full complement of 
N+1 HDDs and in accord with the distribution for operational failures, dOp. There are 





















Note 1: Op failure must be a different HDD than the one 
with a Ld.
Note 2: This transition does not have an explicit rate. It is 








results in transition to State 5, also a DDF state. The operational failure is replaced 
with a new HDD and data reconstructed according to the restoration distribution 
dRestore, returning the RAID group back to State 1 with full operability. The 
distribution, dRestore, includes the delay time to physically incorporate the spare HDD 
and has a minimum time to reconstruct based on HDD the capacity and the maximum 
transfer rate and concurrent foreground data I/O activity. 
6.5 Transition Distributions 
Four component related distributions required for this model: time to operational 
failure (TTOp), time to restore an operational failure (TTR), time to generation of a 
latent defect (TTLd), and time to scrub (TTScrub) HDDs for latent defects. All 
Weibull distributions have the following parameters: 
Location parameter = γ (gamma) 
Shape parameter = β (beta) 
Characteristic Life = η (eta). 
A. Time to Operational Failure (TTOp) 
Chapter 5 illustrated the myriad of possibilities for TTOp distributions. This 
analysis uses a single TTOp distribution to illustrate the difference between a 
representative failure distribution in the proposed model and constant failure rates of 
the MTTDL method. A Weibull failure distribution with a slightly increasing failure 
rate is used. The characteristic life, η, is 461,386 hours. The shape parameter, β, is 




that operated for up to 6,000 hours each. The location parameter is 0. The distribution 











Figure 17 - TTOp failure distribution 
Weibull distribution with location parameter = 0, shape = 1.12 and characteristic 
life = 461,386 hours 
 
 
B. Time to restore (TTR) 
A constant restoration rate implies the probability of completing the restoration 
in any time interval is equally as likely as any other interval of equal length. 
Therefore, it is just as likely to complete restoration in the interval 0 to 48 hours as it 
is in the interval 1,000 to 1,048 hours. But this is clearly unrealistic for two reasons. 
First, there is a finite amount of time required for the HDD to reconstruct all the data 
on the HDD. It is a function of the HDD capacity, the data rate of the HDD, the data 




















transferred as a foreground process. Reconstruction is performed on a high priority 
basis but does not stop all other I/O to accelerate completion. 
This model recognizes that there is a minimum time before which the probability 
of being fully restored is zero. Fibre channel HDDs can sustain up to 100MB/second 
data transfer rates, although 50MB/sec is more common. The data-bus to which the 
RAID group is attached has only a 2 giga-bits per second capability. Thus, in a RAID 
group of 14, a 144GB HDD on a fibre channel interface will require a minimum of 3 
hours with no other I/O to reconstruct the failed HDD. A 500GB, Serial ATA HDD 
on a 1.5Gb data-bus will require 10.4 hours to read all other HDDs and reconstruct a 
HDD that has been replaced. 
The added I/O associated with continuing to serve data will lengthen the time to 
restore an operational failure. Some operating systems place a limit on the amount of 
I/O that takes place during reconstruction, thereby assuring reconstruction will 
complete in a prescribed amount of time. 
Three parameter Weibull distributions are used for the time to repair/restore 
distribution. The minimum time of 6 hours is used for the location parameter, γ. The 
shape parameter, β, of 2 generates a right-skewed distribution, and the characteristic 


















Figure 18 - TTR Distribution 
Location parameter is 6 hours, shape parameter is 2.0, and characteristic life is 12 
hours. No repairs are completed within 6 hours and 95% of all restorations are 
completed in 26.77 hours. 
 
C. Time to latent defect (TTLd) 
Personal conversations with engineers and design teams from 4 of the world’s 
leading HDD manufacturers support the contention that HDD failure rates are usage 
dependent, but the exact transfer function of reliability as a function of use (number 
of reads and writes, lengths of reads and writes, sequential versus random) is not 
known (or they aren’t telling anyone). These analyses approximate use by combining 
read errors per Byte read and the average number of Bytes read per hour. The result is 
shown in Table 3 and the following discussion is the justification.  
Gray [64] concludes that the “bit error rate”, (BER) is fairly inconsequential in 
terms of creating corrupted data. Schwartz [5] claims the rate of data corruption is 




















by specific SCSI error codes and subsequent detailed failure analyses shows that the 
rate of data corruption for all causes is significant and must be included in the 
reliability model. 
Network Appliance completed a study in late 2004 on 282,000 HDDs used in 
RAID architecture. The read error rate (RER), over three months, was 8x10-14 errors 
per Byte read. At the same time, another analysis of 66,800 HDDs showed a RER of 
approximately 3.2x10-13 errors per Byte. A more recent analysis of 63,000 HDDs 
over 5 months showed a much improved 8x10-15 errors per Byte read. In these 
studies, data corruption is verified by the HDD manufacturer as a HDD problem and 
not a result of the operating system controlling the RAID group. 
While Gray [64] asserts that it is reasonable to transfer 4.32x1012 
Bytes/day/HDD, the study of 63,000 HDDs read 7.3x1017 Bytes of data in 5 months, 
an approximate read rate of 2.7x1011 Bytes/day/HDD. The following studies use a 
high of 1.35x1010 Bytes/hour and a low of 1.35x109 Bytes/hour. Using combinations 
of the RERs and amount of Bytes read yields the hourly read failure rates Table 3.  
Since usage varies so greatly by customer and by application, it is assumed that 
the latent defects are created at a constant rate. Therefore, an exponential distribution 
is assumed for this distribution. Two different values are used; 9259 hours is the 
mean for high bytes-read rate, low read-errors per byte; 92950 hours is the mean for 
low bytes-read, low read-errors per byte. While some latent defects are created by 
wear-out mechanisms, data is not available to discern wear-out from those that occur 






















Figure 19 - Exponential distribution for time to occurrence for latent defects 
This figure shows the distribution for high bytes-read per hour, low read-errors per 
byte, a mean of 9259 hours. 
 
D. Time to scrub (TTScrub) 
Latent defects (data corruptions) can occur during almost any HDD activity: 
reading, writing or simply spinning. If not corrected they will result in lost data when 
an operational failure occurs. However, these defects can be eliminated by 
Low Rate High Rate
1.35x109 1.35x1010
Low 8.0x10
-15 1.08x10-5 1.08x10-4 Err/hr
Med 8.0x10
-14 1.08x10-4 1.08x10-3 Err/hr
High 3.2x10
-13 4.32x10-4 4.32x10-3 Err/hr
Bytes Read per Hour





















“background scrubbing”, which is essentially preventive maintenance on data errors. 
Scrubbing occurs during times of idleness or low I/O activity. During scrubbing data 
is read and compared to the parity. If they are consistent, no action is taken. If they 
are inconsistent, the corrupted data is recovered and rewritten to the HDD. If the 
media is defective, the recovered data is written to new physical sectors on the HDD 
and the bad blocks are mapped out.  
Since scrubbing is a background activity performed on an as-possible basis, it 
does not affect system performance. The time required to scrub an entire HDD is a 
random variable that depends on the HDD capacity and the amount of foreground 
activity. If not scrubbed, the period of time to accumulate latent defects starts when 
the HDD first begins operation in the system. The latent defect rate is assumed to be 
constant with respect to time and is based on the error generation rate and the hourly 
data transfer rate. 
Since scrubbing requires reading and writing data, scrubbing can act as a time-to-
failure accelerator for HDD components with usage dependent time to failure 
mechanisms. The optimal scrub pattern, rate and time of scrubbing is HDD specific 
and must be determined in conjunction with the HDD manufacturer to assure that 
HDD operational failure rates are not increased. 
Scrubbing, as with full HDD data reconstruction, has a minimum time to cover 
the entire HDD. The time to complete the scrub is a random variable that depends on 
HDD capacity and I/O activity. The operating system may invoke a maximum time to 
complete scrubbing. The simulations in this paper use a 3-parameter Weibull 




a Normal shaped distribution after the delay set by the location parameter, γ. The 
distribution for γ = 36, η = 168 hours, and β = 3 is shown in Figure 20. The 
distribution for an alternate, quicker scrub is shown in Figure 21, with γ = 0, η = 12 











Figure 20 - Time to scrub density function 
After a defect has been introduced, the time to scrub and remove the defect is 
assumed to follow a "normal" looking distribution. The probability of a complete 




For a sensitivity study, the shape of the TTOp distribution was varied while the 
characteristic life kept constant at 461,386 hours. The probability density and 
































Figure 21 - Short scrub distribution 
This distribution has no delay between the occurrence of the defect and the possible 
time of completing the scrub. With a characteristic life of 12 hours and a shape of 3, 
5% of the scrubs will be completed in less than 4.46 hours and 95% will be 
































































Figure 23 - Cumulative distribution function for study of Weibull shape 
parameter 
The cumulative probabilities of failure cross over each other at the characteristic life 
for all values of beta. The shape of the distribution prior to the characteristic life is 
critical to the analysis of the RAID system. For example, at time 175200 hours, the 
cumulative probability of failure for shape parameter β = 0.8 is0.37, whereas for β 





































Chapter 7  Sequential Monte Carlo Simulations 
The most useful reliability model for a RAID system must be able to properly 
include the following: 
 
• Failure rates that are time dependent (non-constant) 
• Failure rates that are manufacturing vintage dependent 
• Repair models that have an offset (non-zero location parameter) and are time 
dependent (not constant) 
• Permanent errors (data corruptions) that occur during non-write operations 
• Latent defects (data corruptions) that persist 
• Latent defect elimination (through data scrubbing) 
 
Additionally, it must be easy to change the RAID group size and set a mission 
time. The output must provide the maximum amount of information that can be easily 
manipulated to render failure quantities, frequencies and probabilities for the RAID 
group. This model focuses on developing an understanding of the time dependent 
nature of double disk failures (DDFs).  Since this problem does not conform to 
renewal theory [53], the simple multiplication of failure rate and time does not render 
expected number of failures in time. The times to failure generated by the model are 
used to plot the mean cumulative failure distribution [65]. A sequential Monte Carlo 





In a sequential Monte Carlo simulation, the time dependent, or chronological, 
behavior of the system is simulated [66]. For each HDD in the RAID group, a (time) 
sample of each transition time in Figure 16 is taken from the associated underlying 
transition distribution (time to failure or time to restore). The operating and failure 
times are accumulated until a user specified mission time is exceeded, 10 years for 
this research. During that time, the sequence of HDD failures, repairs, latent defects, 
scrubs and DDFs are tracked. Each sequence of sampling required to reach 10 years 
is a single simulation and represents one possible system operating chronology. 
Depending on the input parameters, as many as 50,000 simulations are needed to 
develop the cumulative failure function, described in [65]. Since each simulation is 
equivalent to a single RAID group operating for the 10 year mission, the complete set 
of simulations is equivalent to watching 50,000 systems for 10 years and monitoring 
the DDFs. 
Figure 24 shows the sequential process used in this simulation. For simplicity, 
only four HDD slots are shown. The graph looks like a digital timing diagram with 
the “high signal” representing the operating (non-defective) condition and the “low 
signal” representing the failed (defective) condition. Throughout this process, each 
HDD “slot” in the RAID group carries its own times to failure (both TTOp and 
TTLd) and times to restore (TTR and TTScrub) distributions. Upon a DDF involving 
a HDD with a latent defect, the TTR for the failure is the same as the concomitant 
operational failure time. The Excel Visual Basic program and the flow diagram for 























Figure 24 - “Timing” diagram for sampling TTFs and TTRs 
Initially, a TTF and TTR are sampled for each HDD slot, denoted t1 to t8. Then, 
pair-wise comparisons are made as indicated below the “timing” diagram. If the 
time to failure for the second-youngest event, t3, occurs after the youngest event, t1, 
and before the repair of the youngest failure, t2, then a failure would occur. After the 
comparison, new times are sampled and the comparisons shift to the next older time 
to failure, t5, and its repair time, t6. In the 3rd, 5th and 6th comparisons, DDFs 
occurred. TTF for a HDD with a latent defect is the same as the TTR for the 
Operational failure (see events #3, 5 and 7). The process continues until there is only 
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Slot 2
2 6 8
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New t3 t4  
no Sample new TTF & TTR for slot 3 (t9 & t10)
Old t3 t4
New t5 t6
no Sample new TTF & TTR  for slot 2 (t11 & t12)
Old t5 t6
New t11 t12
yes Shift restart time (t6) to coincide with restoration of slot 2 (t12)
Sample new TTF & TTR for slot 4 (t13 & t14)
Old t11 t12
New t9 t10
no Sample new TTF & TTR  for slot 2 (t15 & t16)
Old t9 t10
New t7 t8
yes Shift restart time (t10) to coincide with restoration of slot 1 (t8)
Sample new TTF & TTR for slot 3 (t17 & t18) not shown
Old t13 t14
New t15 t16
yes Shift restart time (t14) to coincide with restoration of slot 2 (t16)
Sample new TTF & TTR for slot 4 (t19 & t20) not shown










The Monte Carlo simulation process begins with sampling a TTOp and a TTLd 
for every HDD. The TTOp and TTLd arrays are kept separate and sorted separately in 
order to implement conditional failure logic (order of events is critical). For both of 
the two HDDs with the shortest times to failure (or defect), a time to restore (or time 
to scrub) is sampled. If both are operational failures, a DDF exists when the second 
shortest TTOp occurs during the interval in which the other HDD was failed. If any 
sampled time to failure or cumulative run time exceeds the mission time, that slot is 
excluded from the calculation (sorting) process. This is true whether it occurs on the 
first sample or after many samples. This process is reiterated until all the cumulative 
operating times, TTOp plus TTR, for all HDD slots have exceeded the mission time. 
Once a DDF has occurred, a subsequent one cannot occur until the first is restored. 
If both the shortest and second shortest event times are for latent defects, the time 
is not marked as a system failure time because two latent defects will not fail the 
system, and the sampling process continues. If one event is an operational failure and 
one is a latent defect, a DDF exists when the operational failure occurs after the latent 
defect has occurred and before the scrub process corrects the corrupted data from the 
latent defect. This means that the second shortest time to failure must be the 
operational failure and the shortest must be the latent defect.  
Corrupted data introduced as a result of the write process during a reconstruction 
does not cause a DDF. So, a system failure does not occur when the shortest event 
time is the operational failure and the second shortest is a latent defect. If the defect is 
introduced onto the new disk to which data is being reconstructed, it will be corrected 




reconstruction is when it is a non-write related cause (thermal asperity) occurring in 
an unread sector. This is an extremely low probability event and so is omitted. 
If no DDF is detected, then the TTR (or TTScrub) that has already been sampled 
and used in the preceding comparison is added to the earliest time to failure. A new 
TTOp (or TTLd) is sampled, added to the previous sum, and the complete set of times 
to failure for all HDDs in the RAID group are once again resorted and reduced if the 
cumulative time exceeds the mission time. The process is repeated until there is only 
one HDD slot left. 
It could be argued that one-half of the latent defects would occur in locations that 
had already been read (not a DDF) and one-half would occur in locations that had not 
yet been read (DDF). However, the data collected for developing TTLd distributions 





Chapter 8  Model Validation 
The results were generated using Microsoft ExcelTM with the @RISKTM add-in 
from Palisade. Visual Basic for Excel (VBE) was also used for storing intermediate 
data, sorting routines, making comparisons and printing outputs to text files for post 
processing and charting. Using the notation of Ascher [48], these analyses measure 
the rate of occurrence of failure (ROCOF) for the system (not the same as the failure 
rate) and present it as a mean cumulative failure function (MCF). The MCF measures 
the cumulative number of failures in a period of time for a repairable system and can 
be greater then unity [65]. 
The theory behind a Markov process is exactly the same as the process used for 
this simplified Monte Carlo based model. The Monte Carlo simulation can be viewed 
as a discrete time to failure implementation of the Markov process, which requires 
many iterations, sometimes as many as 100,000 to render the probabilities that are 
produced using commonly available computer codes to evaluate Markov models. 
Since the Monte Carlo model used for validation uses only constant failure and repair 
rates, the ROCOF and the Monte Carlo results will be numerically the same even 
though the concepts are different. The need, therefore, is not to validate the theoretic 
equivalence of the two, but the implementation of the Monte Carlo simulation in VBE 
code to make sure it has no errors. 
One nice feature about VBE is the ability to step through the code as it executes. 
Values for all variables (inputs, intermediate calculations and outputs) are visible. 
This way, each calculation, decision, loop and result can be verified visually, one line 




standards. Of the 14 subroutines, six are used only once in a simulation, for input, 
initial filling of arrays and for output. Of the other 8 subroutines, four are repeatedly 
used to gather new samples from distributions and two are sorting (operational sorts 
are separated form latent defect sorts). There are only six decision statements in the 
main part of the program; “If” or “else” conditions. Thus, validation, while tedious, 
was complete and detailed. 
The correctness of the simulation was assessed through two comparative studies. 
The first study duplicates the conditions of a simple Markov model in which the 
distributions for all operational failures and operational repairs were assumed to 
follow an exponential distribution. The latent defects were removed from the model 
by setting an input parameter. The combinations involving latent defects are 
eliminated from the outset. The only combinations remaining are multiple operational 
failures, as in the Markov model. 
This particular set of conditions omits the effects of latent defects, yet still uses 
the VBE code-stream (loops, “if statements”, counters, comparisons) in the same 
manner as in cases in which latent defects are included. These assumptions and 
conditions produce a model that can be directly compared to both the MTTDL 
equation and a simple Markov model. 
The Markov model for a RAID group of 14 is shown in Figure 25. All transition 
rates are assumed to be constant, with the failure rate, λ, of 2x10-6 (MTBF = 500,000 
hours), and repair rate, μ, of 0.0208 (MTTR = 48 hours). A calculation using the 
equation 2 yields MTTDL = 28,617,216 hours (3,266 years). With the assumptions 




the system can be compared numerically to the reciprocal of the MTTDL. This hourly 
“rate” is compared to the results of the Markov model in Table 4. In Figure 26 the 





Figure 25 - First Markov model to validate Monte Carlo model and VBE code 
In state 0, any of the 14 HDDs can fail so the transition rate from state 0 to state 1 is 
14λ. Similarly, in state 1, any of 13 HDDs can fail, so the transition rate has a 
multiplier of 13. 
 
 
For additional code confirmation, a second model comparison was performed in 
which the latent defects were included and treated as a second path for failure with 
constant failure rates. The Markov model for this case is shown in Figure 27 for a 
RAID group with 14 HDDs. The path for operational and latent defects is kept 
separate, with the operational failure leading to State 1 from State 0 and latent failures 
to State 3 from State 0. The latent defect failure rate is the same as the operational 
rate, 2x10-6 per hour and the repair rates are the same for both operational and latent 
defects, 0.0208 per hour. The intent of this is to verify the subroutines and coding 
relating to the latent defects. This is not the model used in the RAID analyses. Again, 







































Figure 26 - Results Comparison for Markov Model and Monte Carlo Simulation 


















































































































Chapter 9  Results 
So far, I have presented justifications for the underlying causes for my thesis:  
a) HDD failures often do not follow a homogeneous Poisson process. Failure 
rates are often increasing or decreasing, not constant 
b) HDD failures do not come from a single population distribution. That is, 
significant time-to-failure variation exists across populations of HDDs from: 
   - different manufacturers 
 - different "families" from the same manufacturer 
 - different vintages in a single "family" from a single manufacturer 
 
Additionally, I have provided the statistical bases behind the assertion that the 
MTTDL and Markov models are incorrect for this type of analysis and I have 
provided the electro-mechanical bases to justify the existence and creation of latent 
defects (undiscovered data corruptions).  
In this section, I complete the defense of my thesis by showing:  
c)  RAID group (system) failures may not follow a homogeneous Poisson 
process, so estimates of the number of DDFs are incorrectly calculated when 
using renewal theory and assuming a HPP 
d) Latent defects in HDD media are either ignored or are modeled too 
simplistically, omitting numerous DDFs 
e) The RAID system logic modeled does not properly account for conditional 




To understand what is driving system behavior, a series of analyses is developed 
that begins with simple assumptions, similar to the HPP assumption associated with 
both MTTDL and Markov models, and gradually builds in complexity. HDD failure 
rates and repair rates are initially assumed to be constant and latent defects non-
existent. Time dependent failure and restoration rates are introduced and latent 
defects are added in, first without scrubbing then with scrubbing. The effects of 
RAID group size is explored along with effects of changing only the TTOp failure 
rate from decreasing to constant, to increasing while including latent defects and 
scrubbing. Lastly, I present actual field data form Network Appliance systems in the 
field that supports the model results. 
Since the model does not assume that the system ROCOF follows a HPP, it 
provides powerful insights as to the true system behavior in time. The most 
significant observations to come out of these results are as follows: 
Observation 5: RAID group (system) failures do not follow a homogeneous Poisson 
process. 
Observation 6: The new model predicts a much higher number of DDFs than 
estimated using MTTDL or Markov models. 
Observation 7: Latent defects combined with operational failures dominate the 
DDFs. 
Observation 8: The time to scrub is critical to the number of DDFs calculated. 
Observation 9: When all the HDD times to failure are drawn from the same 
distribution, the Weibull shape parameter can create significant differences in the 




Observation 10: The field observed read error rate is critical to estimating the number 
of DDFs 
 
Observations 7 through 10 are important because the MTTDL and Markov 
models have never included these concepts and it is not clear that they are capable of 
including them. 
9.1 Comparisons 
A series of studies was performed assuming a RAID group of 8 (7 data +1 parity) 
and a mission duration of 87,600 hours (10 years). The first four cases investigate 
only the effects of the distribution shape for the TTOp and TTR. Latent defects are 
not included. Case #1 assumes TTOp and TTR distributions have constant failure 
rates. Case #2 assumes a time dependent rate for the TTOp, Case #3 assumes a time 
dependent rate for TTR, and Case #4 assumes time dependent rates for both TTOp 
and TTR. Effects of latent defects are explored in Cases #5 and #6. Scrubbing is 
added in Case #7 through #10. Parameters for Cases 1-10 are shown in Table 5.  
 









Code Case γ η β γ η β γ η β γ η β
c-c-na-na 1 0 461386 1.00 0 12 1.0
ft-c-na-na 2 0 461386 1.12 0 12 1.0
c-mt-na-na 3 0 461386 1.00 6 12 2.0
ft-mt-na-na 4 0 461386 1.12 6 12 2.0
c-c-c-na 5 0 461386 1.00 0 12 1.0 0 9259 1.0
ft-mt-c-na 6 0 461386 1.12 6 12 2.0 0 9259 1.0
7 0 461386 1.12 6 12 2.0 0 9259 1.0 6 336 3.0
8 0 461386 1.12 6 12 2.0 0 9259 1.0 6 168 3.0
9 0 461386 1.12 6 12 2.0 0 9259 1.0 0 12 3.0
10 0 461386 1.12 6 12 2.0 0 92590 1.0 6 336 3.0
n/an/a









9.2 No Latent Defects and No Scrubbing 
In Chapter 8, Figure 26 compares the number of DDFs estimated from MTTDL 
to the number estimated by the new model with RAID group size of 14 with a mean 
time to repair of 48 hours, and shows the estimates are comparable. A similar 
comparison is shown in Figure 29 for RAID group size of 8 with MTBF = 461,386 
and MTTR = 12 hours (see Table 5 for complete set of parameters). The results of the 
first four comparisons and the MTTDL are listed in Table 6. The plots in Figure 29 
use the following notation: 
c = constant rate, failure or repair 
ft = failure rate is time dependent 
mt = restoration rate is time dependent 
na = not applicable because the distribution is not used in the analysis 
The positions in the string (w-x-y-z) also have significance as follows: 
Position "w": Failure rate 
Position "x": Restoration rate 
Position "y": Latent defect generation rate 
Position "z": Scrub rate 
 
In each of the four cases shown in Figure 29, 500,000 simulations were required 
to generate the results. The plot indicates there is no significant difference between 
the MTTDL base calculation, Case #1 (c-c-na-na), which assumes the TTOp and TTR 
are constant failure rates, and Case #4, which includes time dependent failure rates 




(Case #1), indicating the selected restoration distribution tends to increase the number 
of DDFs. Case #2, shows the time dependent (increasing) failure rate has decreased 
the number of DDFs expected in 10 years with respect to the base case. Since latent 
defects are not considered, TTLd and TTScrub are "not applicable". 
 
















Figure 29 - Basic Comparisons  
These five comparisons show the impact of constant failure rates and repair rates to 






































c-c-na-na ft-c-na-na ft-mt-na-na c-mt-na-na MTTDL
Case # 1 c-c-na-na 0.26
Case #2 ft-c-na-na 0.164
Case #3 c-mt-na-na 0.374







The results of Cases #2 and #3 may seem counter intuitive and deserve some 
discussion. In comparing Case #1 and Case #2 the characteristic life is the same for 
both (η = 461,386) but Case #2, with an increasing hazard rate (β = 1.12), slightly 
shifts the mass of the probability density function to the longer times, decreasing the 
probability of failure for each HDD for the time period shown in the plot.6 Changing 
the restoration distribution from a constant failure rate (Case #1) to the Weibull with 
parameters show in Table 5, Case #3 (c-mt-na-na), results in an increase in the 
expected number of DDFs. Using the Weibull parameters for the restoration 
distribution shifts the mass of the probability function to the longer times, resulting in 
a longer time that the system is at risk for another failure. The probability density 












Figure 30 - Shift in pdf: Exponential and 3-parameter Weibull 
                                                 
6 By changing only the shape parameter, the mass of the p.d.f. shifts. F(Exp:λ, t) = Exp(461386, 
87600) = 0.173. F(Weibull:η, β, t) = Weibull(461386, 1.12, 87600) = 0.144. 
γ = 0 ;  η = 12 ;  β = 1




















Figure 31 shows the probability of completing the restoration for the Exponential 
and the Weibull, as well as the difference between the two. At time t = 15 hours, the 
probability of restoration based on the Exponential is 0.71 whereas the probability for 
the Weibull is only 0.43. The Exponential has a greater probability of completing the 
restoration than the Weibull until 23 hours have elapsed, at which time they are equal 











Figure 31 - Cumulative Probability of Restoration as a Function of Time 
The probability of completing the restoration is greater for the Exponential than the 
selected 3-parameter Weibull until 22.5 hours. This generally increases the system 
ROCOF under the Exponential assumption when all else remains constant. The 
Delta line is the difference between the Exponential and Weibull probabilities of 
completion. 
 
When combining the time dependent failure rate with the time dependent 
restoration (Case #4, line ft-mt-na-na), the expected number of DDFs is greater than 
for Case #2 and less than Case #3 and, coincidentally, ends up being about the same 































The results in Figure 29 show only small changes. From a practical viewpoint, 
one can question whether the model approximations and unavailability of accurate 
data might render the number of DDFs indistinguishable in a real use of this model. 
The importance of the results in Figure 29 is the confirmation that the model is 
sensitive to changes in the failure and restoration distribution assumptions even for 
small numbers of DDFs. Also notice in Figure 29 that the simulation predicts the 
number of DDFs to be fairly proportional to time, so the ROCOF is fairly constant.  
9.3 Latent Defects without Scrubbing 
In Figure 32, latent defects are added to the model. The latent defect distribution 
is assumed to have a constant rate, so all three distributions used to create the DDF 
plot in Figure 32 have constant failure rates (Case # 5 in Table 5). The expected 
number of DDFs increases to over 1430 in 10 years. Again, for these input 
distributions, the number of DDFs appears fairly proportional in time.  
Next, we explore the impact of non-constant failure rates for the operational 
failures only (TTOp) when the model includes latent defects, but still no scrubbing. 
Figure 33 shows the effects of using the failure and restoration distributions listed in 




















Figure 32 - Case #5: Number of DDFs when Latent Defects are added to Case #1 












Figure 33 - Case #5 vs. Case #6: Effects of Input Distributions when Latent 


























































This is the first example in which the effects of the non-constant failure rates can 
be easily observed. Figure 34 shows the ROCOF as a function of time. An interval of 
1,460 hours was selected. The number of DDFs in each of the intervals was used to 
calculate dN/dt. Note that Case #5, which has all constant failure rates as inputs, 
exhibits a fairly constant ROCOF for the system. Case #6, however, indicates an 












Figure 34 - Rate of Occurrence of Failure (ROCOF) for Cases #5 and #6 
9.4 Latent Defects with Scrubbing 
Some RAID manufacturers, such as Network Appliance, have added scrubbing 
as an operational feature. Figure 35 compares Case #6, which has latent defects 
without scrubbing, to Case #7, which has the same distributional parameters as Case 





















minimum of 6 hours after the defect is introduced. This scrub reduces the number of 





















Figure 35 - Case #6 vs. Case #7: Benefits of 336 hour Scrub 
 
Figure 36 shows the effects of three different scrub schemes. The 336 hr and 168 
hr time to scrub curves assume scrubbing cannot be completed in less than 6 hours. 
The "12 hour scrub" plot assumes there is no minimum time (location parameter γ = 
0), the distribution for time to complete the scrub has a 12 hour characteristic life (η = 












































Figure 36 - Case #7; Case #8 & Case #9: Effects of Scrub Times 
 
 
The next comparison explores the effects of the time to latent defect (TTLd). In 
all the cases so far, the characteristic life for the TTLd has been 9,259 hours, per the 
calculation shown in Table 3. However, if operational procedures or HDD 
manufacturers can reduce the rate of occurrence by a factor of 10, the number of 
DDFs also decreases. Figure 37 shows plots comparing Case #7 to Case #10. The 
only difference between these two cases is an order of magnitude improvement in the 
TTLd for Case #10 (92,590 hours) over Case #7 (9,259 hours). Although somewhat 
difficult to see in these plots, a dN/dt plot (Figure 38) shows the TTLd with the 
shorter characteristic life (9,259) results in an increasing ROCOF (NHPP). For the 



















































Figure 38 - ROCOF for Case #7 and #10 
Case #7 shows the ROCOF more than doubles over the 10 years 




















































9.5 RAID Group Size Effects 
Basic reliability theory indicates that as the quantity of HDDs in a RAID group 
increases, the number of DDFs should also increase for any fixed set of distribution 
parameters. Figure 39 through Figure 42 show the reduction in DDFs as a function of 
RAID group size for four sets of parameters shown in Table 7. The quantity of 
expected DDFs is, to some degree, dependent on the number of combinations of 
HDDs in a RAID group when taken 2 at a time, so one should expect that the number 
of DDFs is greater in a RAID group of 14 than in a smaller group. That is, the larger 
the RAID group, there are more combinations that can result in 2 simultaneous 
failures.  
 












Case γ η β γ η β γ η β γ η β
11 0 461386 1.12 6 12 2.0 0 9259 1.0 6 336 3.0
12 0 461386 1.12 6 12 2.0 0 9259 1.0 3 12 3.0
13 0 461386 1.12 6 12 2.0 0 92590 1.0 6 336 3.0
14 0 461386 1.12 6 12 2.0 0 92590 1.0 3 12 3.0
Operational Latent




























































































































































































where n = number of combinations of interest and r = the number in the group. For 
N+1 RAID, n = 2 and r = number of HDDs in the RAID group. It has already been 
shown that on an absolute basis, the number of DDFs is highly dependent on the 
governing distributions and the inclusion of latent defects, so this analysis examines 
estimation of the number of DDFs based on the binomial coefficients and the number 
calculated from a RAID group that is a different size. That is, if the number of DDFs 
for a RAID group of, say, 14 is calculated, is there a "quick and dirty" way to 
determine the number that would occur in a RAID group of, say, 8 if all the 
distributions are exactly the same as in the RAID group of 14? Table 8 is used 
extensively in this discussion. 
First, the number of combinations (binomial coefficients) is determined for 
RAID group sizes 14, 12, 10, 8, 6, and 4. Then the ratios for all combinations are 
calculated. The "amount of separation" must be considered in the calculating the 
ratios.7 The ratios for all separations are shown in the lower section of Table 8. For 
each separation, the ratio of the binomial combinations is calculated under the sub-
heading "Ratios" in the third column of the table (Binomial Coefficients). Similarly, 
                                                 
7 Separation is the relative difference in quantities of two RAID groups. A group of 14 is "2 apart" 









the ratios are calculated for all amounts of separation for Cases #11 through #14, 
which are in columns 4-7. 
 
 
















There appears to be a strong influence of the possible combinations on the 
expected number of DDFs using the model.8 This is determined by looking at the 
ratio for a separation of 2 (14:12) for both the binomial based and the model based. 
                                                 
8 There is obviously a relationship between the binomial coefficients and the expected number of 
DDFs if the process is HPP. This analysis examines the results to see if that relationship still holds true 
in this model. 
Case #11 Case #12 Case #13 Case #14
14 91 792 46 98.5 5.4
12 66 585 33 72 3.7
10 45 433 20 50 2.5
8 28 283 12.6 32 1.7
6 15 157 7 18.5 1
4 6 74 3.5 8 0.43
2 apart 14:12 1.38 1.35 1.39 1.37 1.46
4 apart 14:10 2.02 1.83 2.30 1.97 2.16
6 apart 14:8 3.25 2.80 3.65 3.08 3.18
8 apart 14:6 6.07 5.04 6.57 5.32 5.40
10 apart 14:4 15.17 10.70 13.14 12.31 12.56
2 apart 12:10 1.47 1.35 1.65 1.44 1.48
4 apart 12:8 2.36 2.07 2.62 2.25 2.18
6 apart 12:6 4.40 3.73 4.71 3.89 3.70
8 apart 12:4 11.00 7.91 9.43 9.00 8.60
2 apart 10:8 1.61 1.53 1.59 1.56 1.47
4 apart 10:6 3.00 2.76 2.86 2.70 2.50
6 apart 10:4 7.50 5.85 5.71 6.25 5.81
2 apart 8:6 1.87 1.80 1.80 1.73 1.70
4 apart 8:4 4.67 3.82 3.60 4.00 3.95










The binomial ratio for 14:12 is 91/66 = 1.38. For Case #11, the ratio is 792/585 = 
1.35.  
Notice that, regardless of the case number and regardless of the absolute number 
of HDDs in the RAID group, there is a fairly consistent relationship within any 
separation and across all cases. Continuing this example, the ratios for Cases #11 
through #14 are 1.35, 1.39, 1.37 and 1.46. Remember that the absolute number of 
DDFs ranges from 792 down to 5.4 for all the Cases with raid group size of 14. It 
appears that if the model based estimate of DDFs is simulated for a specific RAID 
group size, a rough estimate of the number of DDFs for any other RAID group size 
can be calculated using the ratio derived from the binomial coefficients. 
Consider this example. Suppose the simulation of a RAID group of 10 estimated 
that 20 DDFs will occur in the 10 year life. For the same distribution parameters, the 
number that may be calculated for a RAID group of 6 is 6.67, calculated as follows: 
• The binomial base ratio for the ratio of 10:6 is 3.00 
• The number of DDFs estimated from the simulation for RG=10 is 20 
• 20 / 3 = 6.67 
• The estimate for a RAID group of 6 is 7, a fairly close estimate 
 
A perusal of the ratios for any amount of separation from the simulation is fairly 
consistent with that calculated from the binomial coefficients for the same separation 
and the same maximum. This analysis is empirical and has predictable errors. 
However, this clearly shows that even in this new simulation model, the effect of the 




9.6 Effect of Shape Parameter 
This last sensitivity study (Figure 43) examines the effects that the shape 
parameter, β, for the operational failure distribution (TTOp) has on the number of 
DDFs. Case #8 from Table 5 is the basis for the study. Again, the somewhat counter-
intuitive results are produced in that the number of DDFs is greater when the hazard 












Figure 43 - Shape Parameter Effects 
This plot shows the effects of the shape parameter, β, on the number of DDFs. All 
parameters are the same as for Case #8 in Table 5 except the beta for the TTOp 
failure distribution. 
 
However, the rate of change, dN/dt, or ROCOF is steadily decreasing for β = 0.8, 
and appears to be continuously increasing ROCOF when β = 2.0. These results, as 

































the hazard rate of the individual HDDs impacts the ROCOF and should be properly 
accounted for in a system analysis. In this study, a simplistic assumption of β = 1 
produced DDF estimates 121% higher than if the true beta is 1.12, and estimates only 
70% of the DDFs if the β = 0.8 while the characteristic life remains unchanged. The 












Figure 44 - ROCOF for Case #8 with Decreasing and Increasing Failure Rates 
 
9.7 Comparison to Field Data 
The last two studies compare predicted number of DDFs to the field data for 
Network Appliance systems. Whereas the simulations represented between 10,000 
and 500,000 systems operating for 10 years, the subpopulations from Network 
Appliance field are on the order of 10,000 RAID groups for 18 months. Two sets of 



















































Section 9.7.1 presents comparison for 10k rpm HDDs with the FC interface. Section 
9.7.2 presents comparisons for HDDs with the ATA interface. For both the FC and 
ATA data sets, the RAID groups were operating in RAID-69 mode (N+2). During 
reconstruction for an operational failure (TTOp), the times to discovery of a latent 
defect were recorded. These are equivalent to DDFs if the system were operated as 
RAID-4 (or RAID-5) using N+1 redundancy. The exact scrubbing algorithm used by 
NetApp is proprietary and confidential, and cannot be exposed here. However, 
scrubbing cannot be completed in less than 3 hours due to HDD capacity and data-bus 
bandwidth, and will be completed in less than 1 week. For bounding purposes, scrubs 
of 12 and 168 hours are used with a 48 hour scrub as an intermediate modeling point. 
9.7.1 Fibre-Channel HDDs 
Data collected for FC studies includes all HDD manufacturers, all models and all 
vintages combined. The actual TTOp and TTLd are quantity weighted combinations 
of the individual distributions shown in Chapter 5. Field data show that RAID groups 
size 14 and 16 have about the same number of DDFs per 1,000 (Figure 45).  This is a 
consequence of statistical variability in the data. If one considers only the MCF up 
through 13,140 hours, it appears that the number of DDFs for RAID group size 16 is 
greater than that at of size 14, as expected. The number of size 14 RAID groups that 
have been in the field longer than 13,140 hours diminishes to about 800, significantly 
smaller than the 4,600 that have been in the field for the shorter durations (Figure 46). 
RAID groups of size 16 diminish from over 10,000 for the shorter field lives, to fewer 
than 1,000 that have been in the field for over 13,140 hours (Figure 47). Only 3 DDFs 
                                                 




occur after 13,140 hours size 14 and 2 for size 16. The paucity of failures after 13,140 














































FC Field Data 
RG Size = 14






















































Figure 47 - FC RAID Group Size 16: Number of RAID Groups versus DDFs 
 
The ROCOFs for both RAID group size 14 and 16 show stability up to about 
13,140 hours. After that time, the lack of data causes significant fluctuations in the 
ROCOFs (Figure 48 and Figure 49). The conditions surrounding Network Appliance 
field data are most similar to Case # 8 or Case #9, so they are used for comparison to 
the measured field data. If a TTScrub of 48 hours is used, the model and the field data 
are essentially the same for RAID group size 14 and extremely close for size 16 






FC Field Data 
RG Size = 16
































































Figure 49 - ROCOF for FC RAID Group Size 16 
 
FC Field Data: 













FC Field Data: 
























Figure 50 - Fibre Channel 10k rpm, RAID Group Size 14: Model versus Field 
The number of DDFs from NetApp field experience is in between the two modeled 
cases. Since the exact conditions for the field population are not known and knowing 
how sensitive the model is to the input parameters, these bounds are interpreted as 











Figure 51 - Fibre Channel 10k rpm, RAID Group Size 16: Model versus Field 
As in Figure 50, the number of DDFs from NetApp field experience falls near the 48 
hour TTScrub assumption. The exact conditions for the field population are not 
known but these plots must be interpreted as extremely good correlation between the 
predicted model and the field results. 
Need update 





























































9.7.2 ATA Interface HDDs 
The population of ATA HDDs used in this analysis contains several capacities, 
many vintages and is grouped based on RAID group size. Subpopulations of size 14 
and 16 were selected based on overall quantity of data available. The ROCOF for 
both groups show an increasing trend starting at initial turn-on in the field (Figure 
52). This RAID group behavior reflects that of the individual HDDs, which 
demonstrated a high degree of "wear out" after 10,000 hours, similar to that in Figure 
12 in Chapter 5. For both size 14 and 16, the number of RAID groups in the field 
diminishes rapidly in time (Figure 53 and Figure 54). Nearly 6,000 RAID groups size 
16 operated for a short duration, but that number decreases to about 2,000 at 13,870 
hours. For RAID group size 14, the quantity decreased from over 8,000 to about 
1,000 by the same 13,870 hours. The MCF calculation accounts for the change in 
system quantity as described in [54]. For both RAID group sizes the ROCOF (dN/dt) 
increases from time zero, but becomes erratic at 13,870 hours due to the small 
number of RAID group failures. Plots of dN/dt (Figure 55 and Figure 56) quantify the 


































Figure 53 - ATA RAID Group Size 14: Number of Groups versus DDFs 
ATA Field Data: 
RG Size = 16
ATA Field Data: 



























ATA Field Data: 
RG Size = 14









































































Figure 55 - ROCOF for ATA RAID Group Size 14 
 
ATA Field Data: 
RG Size = 16
















































ATA Field Data: 



























Figure 56 - ROCOF for ATA RAID Group Size 16 
 
As with the fibre-channel HDDs, the scrub algorithm for the ATA HDDs in 
Network Appliance systems is proprietary, but is in the range of 12 to 168 hours. 
Thus, exact correlations between the model and the field data are not available. 
However, Figure 57 and Figure 58 show the accuracy of the prediction using the new 
model as compared to the field data. When a 48 hour time to scrub is assumed, the 
model tracks the field results very well for both RAID group sizes. The three model 
lines use the parameters shown in Table 9 and change only the TTScrub. 
 




ATA Field Data: 


















γ η β γ η β γ η β γ η β
0 75000 1.49 6 12 2 0 9259 1 3 48 3
Operational Latent






























ATA Field Data: 






























ATA Field Data: 






























The model fit for RAID group size 14 assuming 48 hour scrub is not quite as 
good a match to the field data as for RAID group size 16, but is still extremely close. 
Because the size 14 RAID group plots below the 48 hour line, it most likely 
experiences scrubs more frequently than for the size 16 RAID group. Since scrubbing 
frequency is an indirect function of the number of HDDs in the RAID group, this plot 
is consistent with expectations relative to the larger RAID group plot. These plots 
show the potential accuracy of the model, especially when compared to the estimates 
derived from the MTTDL method or Markov models. The MTTDL models cannot 
account for latent defects or increasing HDD failure rates. When the operational 
failure rate (TTOp) and repair rate (TTR) are assumed constant with mean values 
75,000 hours and 12 hours respectively, the MTTDL model calculates 6.6 DDFs per 
1000 RAID groups at 13,140 hours (latent defects and scrubbing cannot be included). 
9.8 Results Summary 
The results of these analyses are quite extensive and warrant a summary.  
• Using simplifying assumptions of constant failure rate and replacement rate with 
no latent defects and no scrubbing, the results from the new model are the same as 
for the MTTDL and Markov processes, as they should be. (Section 9.2) 
• The model is sensitive to modifications of the input distributions even without 
latent defects or scrubbing (Section 9.2) 
• Latent defects, if not scrubbed, may cause the number of DDFs to increase by 
5000 times over the number estimated when they are not considered (Section 9.3)  





• Scrubbing can reduce the number of DDFs by multiple orders of magnitudes 
(Section 9.4) 
• Model results are sensitive to Read Error Rate (latent defect distribution) and 
accurate results depend on accurate understanding of the latent defect distribution 
(Section 9.4) 
• The TTLd distribution can result in an ROCOF that is either HPP (constant 
ROCOF) or NHPP depending on the value selected. (Section 9.4) 
• RAID group size has a loosely predictable impact for a given set of input 
distributions. Ratios of binomial coefficients may provide "ball park" estimates 
(Section 9.5) 
• The shape parameter (β for Weibull) can greatly affect the ROCOF. Assuming a 
constant failure rate (β = 1) when it isn't can yield inaccurate results (Section 9.6) 
• Field data match the model for two different sets of distributions (Section 9.7) 
o Fibre-channel HDDs which have a moderate characteristic life (461,386 
hours) and slightly increasing failure rate (shape parameter = 1.14) 
o ATA HDDs, which have a low characteristic life (75,000 hours) and 
significantly increasing failure rate (shape parameter = 1.4) 
• The model clearly shows the potential to predict the number of DDFs expected in 
the field much better than the MTTDL or Markov models (Section 9.7) 
• The model generally predicts greater number of DDFs than for the MTTDL 
method due to the inclusion of latent defects and time dependent input 





• Numeric comparisons of the number of DDFs for the various cases show that in 
all cases, the number of DDFs estimated from the model is greater than the 
number estimated from the MTTDL. 
 












Time RG = 14 RG = 16
MTTDL n/a 0.13 0.18
12 hrs 4.2 5.5
48 hrs 18 24
168 hrs 57 69
New Model
Scrub 
Time RG = 14 RG = 16
MTTDL n/a 6.8 9
12 hrs 7 36
48 hrs 27 108





Chapter 10 Conclusions 
Conclusions are separated into my contribution and added value of my research, 
and the impact of my research. 
10.1 Significant New Research 
While some of the research is well known but not published (HDD failure 
modes, mechanisms), the impact of these failure modes on the model is novel. 
Previous researchers have usually ignored latent defects. Data can become corrupt 
simply by having the head fly over the disc surface. Reading or writing is not 
necessary and "bit rot" is negligible as a failure mode. My contribution is that by 
clearly identifying the failure modes and mechanisms of interest, dividing them into 
operational and latent, I was able to collect appropriate and accurate data for the 
model. 
One of the greatest contributions is the understanding of failure distributions for 
HDDs used in RAID usage environments. These studies have identified data 
attributes critical to developing an accurate model. These attributes include 
recognition that HDD failure rates are rarely constant and are highly dependent on 
manufacturer and vintage. 
The read error rates reported are also a significant contribution. These were 
developed from large populations of HDDs and provide a better understanding of 




10.2 Added Value in Modeling 
This research has resulted in a very flexible and comprehensive model to assess 
the expected number of double disk failures. The modeling technique addresses many 
of the erroneous assumptions that prevent the MTTDL and Markov based estimates 
from being accurate. I have corrected two dominant errors that have not been 
addressed to date: 
• System ROCOF is not the same as the failure rate: ROCOF is sequence dependent 
whereas the commonly used "failure rate" is not sequence dependent 
• Input distributions are not homogeneous Poisson processes 
o HDD failures are time dependent 
o Restoration distributions are time dependent 
o Restoration distributions may have a minimum time to restore (non-zero 
location  parameter) 
o Once written, data can become corrupt (change) 
10.3 New Model 
The culmination of this research is a new model method. I developed a sequential 
Monte Carlo method that mimics the sequential nature of the failure process and 
restoration processes. Each HDD slot carries its own failure, restoration, latent defect 
and scrub distributions. This allows some fraction of the HDDs to possess different 
distributional characteristics than the remaining, as is the case for multiple vintages or 
mixtures of HDDs from different manufacturers. 
The model recognizes and models the conditionality between the operational and 




latent defect occurs first will result in a DDF. Operationally, the probability of a latent 
defect occurring after the operational failure is only possible by getting a data erasure 
(a subset of the read error rate) in a section of the unrecovered data blocks on the 
media of the other HDDs during the 12 to 168 hours of reconstruction. Since this 
probability is extremely small, this sequence of events is excluded from the model. 
However, the model does include data corruption as a function of time and usage as 
the basis for the latent defects. 
The model can accept RAID groups of size 2 to 25 and any user defined mission 
time. Latent defects can be excluded if desired. This feature was used in the 
debugging and troubleshooting of the visual basic macro. The model has 
demonstrated sensitivity to all input parameters and is consistent with the MTTDL 
and Markov models when the inputs are set to produce HPP ROCOF. The model has 
shown its ability to very accurately model RAID groups of size 14 and 16 that have 
been deployed in the field for over 18 months. The model and field data, confirm the 
superiority of this model over any other developed to date. 
10.4 Impact of the Research 
 The impact of this research is evident in several ways. This paper has been 
accepted for presentation at the 37th Annual IEEE/IFIP Conference on Dependable 
System and Networks, June, 2007. It will be published in the IEEE-DSN/DCCS 
Proceedings. The field data has been the subject of 6 publications [58], [59], [60], 
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10.5 Future work 
After discussions with design engineers at Maxtor, Hitachi, Seagate, Fujitsu and 
Western Digital, all assert that usage affects reliability. Not so much in terms of bulk 




profile of reading and writing, the length of the blocks written and whether the writes 
are sequential or random. However, a recent paper [67] asserts that the relationship 
between usage and failures is "weaker than previous work has suggested." This 
apparent discrepancy between the HDD manufacturers and a respectable data analysis 
needs further investigation. The significance is great in that the usage/duty cycle can 
affect the operational time to failure and, more worrisome, the generation of latent 
defects. The significant questions relate not to the macro level duty cycle of percent 
I/O, but the specific head usage.  
The second area is in expanding the model to include RAID-6, the N+2 
redundancy configuration. Knowing that HDDs will continue to grow in capacity 
(750 GB is now available and a 1TB will be available soon) means the number of 
latent defects will also increase. While this can be remedied in part by scrubbing, 
additional scrubbing impacts the system performance. An obvious question is, should 
all high reliability RAID systems be made with RAID-6? Can RAID-4 and RAID-5 
continue to provide the necessary reliability without affecting performance? There are 
some people who believe all systems should be RAID-6 today! 
A last area, although of lower importance, is developing a better understanding 
of whether there is any noticeable predicted difference between RAID-4 and RAID-5. 
Some contend that RAID-4 is more stressful on the parity HDD than RAID-5. 
Tentative data doesn't support that contention, but modeling can investigate the 




Chapter 11 Appendices 
These appendices document important aspects of this research, including creation 
of a MCF plot in Section 11.1, the Excel input page in 11.2.1, the VBE code in 
11.2.2, and the output necessary "post-processing" in 11.3. 
 
11.1 Mean Cumulative Failure function 
Results of the new model and the Monte Carlo simulations are presented as mean 
cumulative failure plots (MCFs). These plots are non-parametric (do not assume an 
underlying failure distribution), can plot values greater than unity and are, therefore, 
excellent for presenting RAID system results without assuming a HPP. Each plot 
represents 1,000 identical RAID groups only to allow the ordinate to exceed unity for 
plotting purposes. These plots can be physically interpreted as having been generated 
in the following manner: 
• 1000 systems of RAID N+1 are placed in a room and run for 10 
years (87,600 hours). 
• Operating time for all systems combined is tracked periodically 
(hourly), as is the cumulative number of failures. 
• When a failure occurs, the cumulative number of failures is 






 Since the system is restored (per the model assumptions) it can experience 
multiple failures in the 10 years. This is very similar to a CDF in the probability 
space, but a CDF, by definition, never exceeds unity. MCF plots are usually presented 
as "stair-steps". As an example of how they are created, consider a group of 5 systems 
that all begin operation at the same time and run for 2 years (17,520 hours). The time 
to failure and the associated system number and the mean cumulative failure percent 
are shown in Table 12. Systems 1, 2, 3 and 5 experienced failures, but system 4 did 
not. 
 








The times to failure are plotted in Figure 59. The left axis indicates the 
cumulative number of failures per the population of 5 systems. Notice that the 
fraction of failures, plotted on the right axis and expressed as a percentage, is 120%. 
This means that, on the average, there were 1.2 failures per system after 2 years 
operation. From this plot, the general trend of the ROCOF can be deduced. A straight 
line (constant slope) means the ROCOF is neither increasing nor decreasing. In this 
plot, the rate is generally increasing (has a positive slope). Ascher [52] cautions 
1 500 1 20%
2 6430 5 40%
3 10587 3 60%
4 12249 2 80%
5 13280 3 100%












against attempting to fit a distribution to this curve, however, because there is no 
basis for a single underlying distribution. The shape may decrease or oscillate after 









Figure 59 - Plot of MCF example 
Notice from this MCF that the ROCOF for this system is increasing (in general) 
 
 
11.2 Sequential Monte Carlo Simulation 
The inputs for the Monte Carlo simulation are extremely flexible, but require 
attention to make sure they are really what you want them to be. There is no error 
checking for bizarre inputs or accidental errors.  
11.2.1 Inputs 
The input example in Figure 60 illustrates this. The model conditions are shown 
in the upper left section of the figure in lavender color. These include the total 
number of HDDs in the RAID group (N + 1 = 8), the mission duration (87,600 

































simulation includes latent defects (y/n). The number of parity disks is included as a 
variable to permit future modification, so it can evaluate N + 2 (RAID-DP) systems, 
but currently it is capable only of N+1 systems. The "screen" is set to "off" so the 
computer screen will not be updated as the simulation progresses. When "on", the 















Figure 60 - Example of Monte Carlo inputs 
 
The distribution parameters for the HDDs are on the right side of Figure 60. 
There are four distributions associated with each HDD slot. This permits one to 




TTF HDD TTR HDD TTF HDD TTR HDD Gamma Eta Beta Gamma Eta Beta Gamma Eta Beta Gamma Eta Beta
295438 1 2.00 1 10011988 1 10000010.47 1 0 461,386 1 0 12 1 10000000 9,259 1 10000000 10 3
159567 2 5.00 2 10009626 2 10000008.69 2 0 461,386 1 0 12 1 10000000 9,259 1 10000000 10 3
358243 3 27.00 3 10001644 3 10000012.08 3 0 461,386 1 0 12 1 10000000 9,259 1 10000000 10 3
285196 4 1.00 4 10000481 4 10000007.11 4 0 461,386 1 0 12 1 10000000 9,259 1 10000000 10 3
839832 5 1.00 5 10014240 5 10000005.86 5 0 461,386 1 0 12 1 10000000 9,259 1 10000000 10 3
53103 6 46.00 6 10025354 6 10000009.61 6 0 461,386 1 0 12 1 10000000 9,259 1 10000000 10 3
1076381 7 32.00 7 10001825 7 10000003.12 7 0 461,386 1 0 12 1 10000000 9,259 1 10000000 10 3
87957 8 19.00 8 10006161 8 10000013.60 8 0 461,386 1 0 12 1 10000000 9,259 1 10000000 10 3
3513241 9 9.00 9 10004084 9 10000008.55 9 0 461,386 1 0 12 1 10000000 9,259 1 10000000 10 3
31050 10 0.00 10 10010974 10 10000018.24 10 0 461,386 1 0 12 1 10000000 9,259 1 10000000 10 3
52924 11 1.00 11 10011507 11 10000015.35 11 0 461,386 1 0 12 1 10000000 9,259 1 10000000 10 3
344613 12 17.00 12 10002035 12 10000005.17 12 0 461,386 1 0 12 1 10000000 9,259 1 10000000 10 3
2266872 13 10.00 13 10011745 13 10000011.35 13 0 461,386 1 0 12 1 10000000 9,259 1 10000000 10 3
1537429 14 13.00 14 10001418 14 10000009.70 14 0 461,386 1 0 12 1 10000000 9,259 1 10000000 10 3
481117 15 28.00 15 6658 15 61.61 15 0 461,386 1.12 25.424 2 2 0 9,259 1 12 50 3
536569 16 8.00 16 5545 16 37.57 16 0 461,386 1.12 6.7001 2 2 0 9,259 1 12 50 3
24465 17 13.00 17 1152 17 35.65 17 0 461,386 1.12 9.9815 2 2 0 9,259 1 12 20 3
193836 18 20.00 18 6436 18 27.41 18 0 461,386 1.12 18.129 2 2 0 9,259 1 12 20 3
1240076 19 26.00 19 14375 19 32.21 19 0 461,386 1.12 24.849 2 2 0 9,259 1 12 20 3
394034 20 8.00 20 3328 20 30.18 20 0 461,386 1.12 7.617 2 2 0 9,259 1 12 20 3
1004375 21 9.00 21 11377 21 17.75 21 0 461,386 1.12 6.7506 2 2 0 9,259 1 12 20 3
532137 22 9.00 22 1355 22 23.18 22 0 461,386 1.12 7.2214 2 2 0 9,259 1 12 20 3
265086 23 13.00 23 12884 23 12.74 23 0 461,386 1.12 11.468 2 2 0 9,259 1 12 20 3
380140 24 15.00 24 2076 24 16.87 24 0 461,386 1.12 13.655 2 2 0 9,259 1 12 20 3
476032 25 8.00 25 24737 25 17.37 25 0 461,386 1.12 6.8366 2 2 0 9,259 1 12 20 3





DON'T MOVE ANY OF THESE CELLS!!!!!!!!!





Time To Failure Time To Scrub
Parameters Parameters
This is the same as 9-17-06 but i am going to try to allow latent defects w/o scrubbing by restarting all the HDDs with LD; and not double counting the 
same Op failure that occurs in multiple Lf times. It WORKS!!! 9/29/06
Model and simulation control HDD distribution parameters. Only the first 
8 are used in this particular simulation. 
Values of the distributions based on the parameters to the 
right. These change every time the specific variable is re-
sampled. If not re-sampled, they remain unchanged. Only the 
first 8 are used (NHDD=8). The values of the remaining are 
irrelevant because they are not used. 
Gammas are variable; 
γ = 6.7 + Weibull(0.5, 4), 




model mixtures of HDD manufacturers or vintages by using different parameters. The 
sampled values for the distributions are shown on the left half of the figure. Initially, 
all are sampled once. Subsequently, new values are sampled only when needed, per 
the description in Chapter 7. The @RISKTM add-in for Microsoft's ExcelTM is used to 
generate the sampled values from the parameters.  
11.2.2 ExcelTM Visual Basic Macro 
A macro based on Excel's Visual Basic (VBE) is used to determine when two 

























































Figure 61 - Flow chart for VBE macro 
Define Variables
Set up output file
Set screen updating
Print DDF output for an Op-
Op failure









Eliminate slots that exceed 
Call LDBubbleSort








Print DDF output for an Op-Ld












Fill the Op TTF array
Fill the Op TTR array
Set dummy variable OpSize = NHDD
Sort TTFOp from shortest to longest
Reduce OpSize to include only TTFs smaller 
than the mission time
Include
Latent defects?




Get another LdTTR Get another OpTTR
Is last











11.2.3 Output Format 
An example output file is shown in Figure 62. At the top of the file are all the 
input parameters. These are followed by the results. Included in the results are the 
simulation number that generated the DDF. To the right of that is the earliest time of 
the interval that the system was at risk (had its first failure or latent defect). The 
second column shows the time of the second failure (that resulted in the DDF) and the 
fourth column shows the end of the risk-interval. Finally, the last column indicates 
whether the failure was a result of two operational failures, denoted OP, or the result 
of a latent defect followed by an operational failure, denoted LD. The example 
provided was actually run for 100 runs, but to fit the page, the figure was cropped and 




























Figure 62 - Example of simulation output 
RAID Group Size = 8
Parity Disks = 1
Mission Duration = 87600
Using Latent Defects? y
Simulations = 100
Operational Latent
Time to Failure Time to Repair Time to Failure Time to Repair
Gamma Eta Beta Gamma Eta Beta Gamma Eta Beta Gamma Eta Beta
0 461386 1 0 12 1 6 9259 1 10000000 10 3
0 461386 1 0 12 1 6 9259 1 10000000 10 3
0 461386 1 0 12 1 6 9259 1 10000000 10 3
0 461386 1 0 12 1 6 9259 1 10000000 10 3
0 461386 1 0 12 1 6 9259 1 10000000 10 3
0 461386 1 0 12 1 6 9259 1 10000000 10 3
0 461386 1 0 12 1 6 9259 1 10000000 10 3
0 461386 1 0 12 1 6 9259 1 10000000 10 3
Sim #  TTF1  TTF2  TTF1+TTR1
1 790 20508 10000801 Ld
1 20757 27494 10020766 Ld
1 27748 32975 10027760 Ld
3 1637 37602 10001643 Ld
5 535 27325 10000549 Ld
8 278 32602 10000292 Ld
14 1875 60753 10001877 Ld
14 61424 68569 10061433 Ld
14 68621 84653 10068626 Ld
23 280 1966 10000294 Ld
24 129 9082 10000141 Ld
24 9951 34532 10009959 Ld
26 257 8731 10000265 Ld
28 1487 60870 10001495 Ld
29 39 40965 10000046 Ld
32 913 45581 10000924 Ld
32 50649 76951 10050664 Ld
44 705 43697 10000717 Ld
45 188 2193 10000193 Ld
45 3763 8437 10003774 Ld
45 8979 36600 10008984 Ld
46 330 26179 10000335 Ld
46 26293 43937 10026304 Ld
46 45637 46383 10045646 Ld
50 851 21223 10000856 Ld
50 23226 56786 10023236 Ld
51 2303 47856 10002310 Ld
51 48631 60409 10048641 Ld
56 749 4675 10000759 Ld
58 359 54537 10000366 Ld
58 55114 57124 10055129 Ld
62 291 74727 10000303 Ld
65 644 29918 10000654 Ld
65 30350 32021 10030360 Ld
68 184 24924 10000192 Ld
79 1939 5186 10001952 Ld
82 5724 43841 10005738 Ld
83 74 8335 10000083 Ld
83 8636 41190 10008645 Ld
84 743 15840 10000750 Ld
84 16531 28815 10016545 Ld
84 28850 51654 10028854 Ld
85 74 25506 10000079 Ld
85 25853 46023 10025863 Ld
85 46118 62746 10046126 Ld
87 989 30964 10000999 Ld
90 1163 47620 10001180 Ld





The results in Figure 62 need a bit of post processing to create the MCF plots. 
First all the times to DDF must be sorted from smallest to largest. The, the plotting 
positions must be determined, based on the number of simulations needed to create 
































Figure 63 - Output Example with Post-processing 
The post-processing is shown in the red rectangle and the chart to the right. This is 
done manually. 
RAID Group Size = 8
Parity Disks = 1
Mission Duration = 87600
Using Latent Defects? y
Simulations = 100
Operational Latent
Time to Failure Time to Repair Time to Failure Time to Repair
Gamma Eta Beta Gamma Eta Beta Gamma Eta Beta Gamma Eta Beta
0 461386 1 0 12 1 6 9259 1 10000000 10 3
0 461386 1 0 12 1 6 9259 1 10000000 10 3
0 461386 1 0 12 1 6 9259 1 10000000 10 3
0 461386 1 0 12 1 6 9259 1 10000000 10 3
0 461386 1 0 12 1 6 9259 1 10000000 10 3
0 461386 1 0 12 1 6 9259 1 10000000 10 3
0 461386 1 0 12 1 6 9259 1 10000000 10 3
0 461386 1 0 12 1 6 9259 1 10000000 10 3
Sim #  TTF1  TTF2  TTF1+TTR1
1 790 20508 10000801 Ld 1966 0.01
1 20757 27494 10020766 Ld 2193 0.02
1 27748 32975 10027760 Ld 4675 0.03
3 1637 37602 10001643 Ld 5186 0.04
5 535 27325 10000549 Ld 5799 0.05
8 278 32602 10000292 Ld 8335 0.06
14 1875 60753 10001877 Ld 8437 0.07
14 61424 68569 10061433 Ld 8731 0.08
14 68621 84653 10068626 Ld 9082 0.09
23 280 1966 10000294 Ld 12184 0.1
24 129 9082 10000141 Ld 15840 0.11
24 9951 34532 10009959 Ld 16633 0.12
26 257 8731 10000265 Ld 20508 0.13
28 1487 60870 10001495 Ld 21223 0.14
29 39 40965 10000046 Ld 24924 0.15
32 913 45581 10000924 Ld 25392 0.16
32 50649 76951 10050664 Ld 25506 0.17
44 705 43697 10000717 Ld 26179 0.18
45 188 2193 10000193 Ld 27325 0.19
45 3763 8437 10003774 Ld 27494 0.2
45 8979 36600 10008984 Ld 28815 0.21
46 330 26179 10000335 Ld 29918 0.22
46 26293 43937 10026304 Ld 30964 0.23
46 45637 46383 10045646 Ld 32021 0.24
50 851 21223 10000856 Ld 32602 0.25
50 23226 56786 10023236 Ld 32975 0.26
51 2303 47856 10002310 Ld 34532 0.27
51 48631 60409 10048641 Ld 36600 0.28
56 749 4675 10000759 Ld 37602 0.29
58 359 54537 10000366 Ld 40965 0.3
58 55114 57124 10055129 Ld 41190 0.31
62 291 74727 10000303 Ld 43697 0.32
65 644 29918 10000654 Ld 43841 0.33
65 30350 32021 10030360 Ld 43937 0.34
68 184 24924 10000192 Ld 45581 0.35
79 1939 5186 10001952 Ld 46023 0.36
82 5724 43841 10005738 Ld 46383 0.37
83 74 8335 10000083 Ld 47620 0.38
83 8636 41190 10008645 Ld 47856 0.39
84 743 15840 10000750 Ld 51433 0.4
84 16531 28815 10016545 Ld 51654 0.41
84 28850 51654 10028854 Ld 54537 0.42
85 74 25506 10000079 Ld 56786 0.43
85 25853 46023 10025863 Ld 57124 0.44
85 46118 62746 10046126 Ld 60409 0.45
87 989 30964 10000999 Ld 60753 0.46
90 1163 47620 10001180 Ld 60870 0.47
90 47954 51433 10047964 Ld 62746 0.48
92 4878 25392 10004887 Ld 68569 0.49
93 1053 69381 10001063 Ld 69381 0.5
98 516 5799 10000524 Ld 74727 0.51
99 941 12184 10000950 Ld 76951 0.52
















A - Amp 
Å - Angstrom 
A/cm2 - Amps per square centimeter 
AFM - anti-ferromagnetic 
AMR - Anisotropic magneto-resistive 
BER - Bit error rate 
C = Degrees centigrade 
DDF - Double disk failure 
DRAM - Dynamic random access memory 
ECC - Error correcting codes 
EM - Electro-migration 
EOS - Electrical overstress 
ESD - Electro-static discharge 
eV - electron volt 
FM - ferromagnetic 
GB - Giga-byte 
GMR - giant magnetoresistance 
HBM - Human body model 
Hc - Coercivity field 
HDD - Hard disk drive 
Hex - Exchange field 
HP - Homogeneous Poisson 
HPP - Homogeneous Poisson process 
I/O - Input/Output 
LMR - Longitudinal magnetic recording 
ma - milliamp 
MB - Mega-byte 
μ-in - micro-inch 
MKV - Markov 
mm - millimeter 
MTTDL - Mean time to data loss 
NHP - Non-homogeneous Poisson 
NHPP - Non-homogeneous Poisson process 
nJ - nano-Joule 
NRRO - Non-repeatable run-out 
ns - nano-second 
PES - Position error sensing 
PMR - Perpendicular magnetic recording 
PWA - Printed wiring assembly 
PWBA - Printed wiring board assembly 
R - Resistance 
RAID - Redundant array of inexpensive disks 




RRO - Repeatable run-out 
T/A - Thermal asperity 
Tb - Blocking temperature 
TPI - Tracks per inch 
TTLd - Time to latent defect 
TTOp - Time to operational failure 
TTR - Time to restore 
TTScrub - Time to scrub 
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